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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis, I study how the credit rating of a company affects the information content, i.e., 
the stock price and trading volume reaction, of its earnings announcements in stock markets. 
I also examine how this impact differs between positive and negative earnings news as well as 
analyzing the effects of preceding rating changes. Finally, the study looks into how the 
relationship between ratings and informativeness of earnings announcements is affected by 
the level of information asymmetry surrounding firms and disclosure regulation changes. 
According to my knowledge, this is the first study to provide a more comprehensive view on 
the informational role of ratings around earnings announcements in stock markets. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on 81,990 earnings announcements (from 2,765 
unique firms) made in the US stock market by S&P rated firms in the period from February 
1986 to December 2013. The methodology of this paper consists of traditional event study 
methods employing both univariate analysis and multivariate regressions where the 
information content of earnings releases is measured with cumulative abnormal returns and 
trading volumes over the [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] announcement windows. The impact of credit 
ratings is analyzed with different rating specifications.  
RESULTS 
I find that the stock price and trading volume reactions around earnings disclosures are more 
pronounced for firms with lower ratings. For example, in the event of a negative earnings 
surprise, a one notch decrease in a company’s credit rating is associated with a 0.25% more 
negative stock price reaction to earnings releases. Furthermore, a one notch lower credit 
rating results in 0.15% more of the outstanding shares being traded in the market around an 
earnings announcement. These findings indicate that lower ratings increase the information 
content of earnings releases and are in line with the univariate results of Greatrex (2009) but 
do not support the results of Leventis et al. (2014) who argue that higher ratings increase the 
informativeness of earnings announcements. Additional findings include that lower ratings 
are associated with even larger market reactions in the case of negative earnings surprises, 
when firms are characterized by more information asymmetry and when disclosure 
regulation changes increase the informational advantage of rating agencies. Preceding rating 
changes also increase the information content of earnings releases in some cases. Overall, my 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that better credit ratings reduce information 
asymmetry in financial markets. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän pro gradu -tutkielman tavoite on tutkia, kuinka yrityksen luottoluokitus vaikuttaa 
tulosjulkistuksen informaatiosisältöön (ts. julkistuksen aiheuttama osakkeen hinnan ja 
volyymin muutos) osakemarkkinoilla. Selvitän myös, kuinka tämä vaikutus eroaa hyvien ja 
huonojen tulosuutisten välillä, jonka lisäksi tarkastelen edeltävien luottoluokitusmuutoksien 
vaikutusta. Lopuksi tutkin, miten yhteys luottoluokitusten ja tulosjulkistuksien 
informaatiosisällön välillä riippuu informaation epäsymmetrisyydestä yritysten ympärillä 
sekä tiedottamissäännöksien muuttumisesta. Minun tietääkseni tämä on ensimmäinen 
kokonaisvaltainen tutkimus luottoluokitusten informaatioroolista osakemarkkinoiden 
tulosjulkistusten yhteydessä.  
AINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu S&P:n luokittelemien yritysten 81 990 tulosjulkistuksesta 
(2 765 eri yritykseltä) Yhdysvaltain osakemarkkinoilla ajanjaksolta 1986-2013. 
Tutkimusmenetelmänä käytetään perinteistä tapahtumatutkimusta hyödyntäen sekä yhden 
muuttujan analyysiä että usean muuttujan regressiota, joissa tulosjulkistusten 
informaatiosisältö mitataan epänormaaleilla osaketuotoilla ja -volyymeilla 
tapahtumaikkunoissa [-1, +1] ja [-2, +2]. Luottoluokitusten vaikutusta tarkastellaan erilaisilla 
luottoluokitusmäärittelyillä.  
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että muutokset osakkeen hinnassa ja volyymissa tulosjulkistuksen 
ympärillä ovat voimakkaampia, kun yrityksen luottoluokitus on alhaisempi. Esimerkiksi 
negatiivisen tulosyllätyksen tapauksessa, yhden pykälän alempi luottoluokitus aiheuttaa 0.25 
prosenttia enemmän negatiivisen osakehintareaktion. Yhtä pykälää heikompi luottoluokitus 
johtaa myös siihen, että ulkona olevia osakkeita vaihdetaan 0.15 prosenttia enemmän 
tulosjulkistuksen yhteydessä. Nämä löydökset osoittavat, että heikommat luottoluokitukset 
lisäävät tulosjulkistusten informaatiosisältöä ja tämä on linjassa Greatrexin (2009) yhden 
muuttujan tulosten kanssa. Leventis et al. (2014) väittävät, että paremmat luottoluokitukset 
lisäävät tulosjulkistusten informatiivisuutta, mutta löydökseni eivät tue tätä näkemystä. 
Lisäksi tulokseni näyttävät, että alhaisemmat luottoluokitukset aiheuttavat suurimmat 
markkinareaktiot, kun tulosyllätys on negatiivinen, kun yritysten ympärillä on enemmän 
epäsymmetristä informaatiota ja kun tiedottamissäännösten muuttuminen lisää 
luottoluokittajan informaatioetua. Edeltävät luottoluokitusmuutokset lisäävät myös joskus 
tulosjulkistusten informaatiosisältöä. Tutkimustulokset tukevat hypoteesia, jonka mukaan 
paremmat luottoluokitukset vähentävät epäsymmetristä informaatiota rahoitusmarkkinoilla. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
”Credit ratings can help reduce the knowledge gap, or ‘information asymmetry’, 
between borrowers (issuers) and lenders (investors) … Credit rating symbols 
convey information … they convey forward-looking, summary opinions about a 
borrower’s or security’s creditworthiness.”  –  (Standard & Poor’s, 2012) 
“A day after GoPro reported quarterly results and its stock slumped, Chief 
Executive Nick Woodman emphasized the action video camera maker's long-term 
growth strategy … The stock drop ‘doesn't affect us because we have such a strong 
vision for the future. I have so much faith in what we're doing here’, Woodman 
told CNBC.”  –  (CNBC, 1 August 20141) 
Credit rating agencies have an important role as intermediaries in financial markets and their 
ratings have informational value (Baghai et al., 2014). The agencies aim to mitigate 
uncertainty in security markets, especially in debt markets, by assigning credit ratings to 
companies and their debt instruments. These ratings are meant to reduce information 
asymmetry between companies and investors as they provide forward-looking opinions about 
a firm’s financial performance in the market and ability to pay back debt obligations. As these 
ratings are first and foremost directed towards borrowers, questions still remain whether the 
information provided by credit ratings can be useful to other economic actors, namely 
shareholders and managers. Despite higher credit ratings yielding several potential benefits to 
a company, many companies have nevertheless decided to pursue increased shareholder value 
by lowering or abandoning corporate credit rating targets (Kisgen, 2007). 
As is the case with the value of credit ratings to shareholders, questions have also been raised 
regarding the informational content of earnings announcements, i.e., the announcement stock 
price/volume reaction. The impact of earnings disclosures has been examined in many studies 
but the topic remains of great interest as the information content of these disclosures has 
varied over the years. Several explanations have been proposed to account for this, including 
accounting standards’ inability to keep up with the shift to an economy increasingly based on 
intangible assets, opportunistic earnings management and the adoption of IFRS accounting 
standards (see, e.g., Landsman and Maydew, 2002; Jorion et al., 2009; Landsman et al., 
2012). Despite the extensive research on the determinants of earnings releases’ information 
content, only a few papers have used the corporate credit rating as an explanatory variable.  
                                                          
1 Retrieved February 6, 2015, from http://www.cnbc.com/id/101887325. 
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Companies’ earnings announcements and equity investors’ reactions to them provide an 
excellent avenue for testing whether a corporation’s credit rating can be beneficial 
information even in the eyes of shareholders. More specifically, it is interesting to know if a 
corporation’s credit rating can predict the magnitude of the information content of earnings 
announcements in stock markets and thus act as a proxy for information asymmetry. This 
would also provide more insight regarding what drives the information content of earnings 
announcements after controlling for earnings surprise, among other things.  
Earnings announcements are crucial events for investors as they reveal new information about 
companies’ performance and thus affect future expectations. Valuation theory states that there 
is a distinct relationship between earnings and stock prices (Beaver, 1968). Consequently, 
stock prices and trading volumes react to reflect this new information content. This presents a 
problem for shareholders as well as managers. Shareholders are uncertain as to how this new 
information will change the value of their holdings and whether the new information is likely 
to alter their perception of the company. In other words, shareholders need more guidance in 
order to understand when the information provided by earnings announcements might be 
more important and whether the information content differs between companies.  
At the same time, managers also face uncertainty as to how the markets will react to the 
information content of earnings announcements. After all, earnings announcements reveal 
how the management has performed and therefore, managers are very keen to improve their 
understanding of how investors interpret the content of earnings announcements. If 
considerable information asymmetries exist between managers and shareholders, it is in the 
interest of both parties to resort to other signals in order to reduce this asymmetry. For 
example, if the management takes actions to focus on long-term performance at the expense 
of short-term profitability, negative reactions from shareholders are probable if information 
asymmetry is present. The fact that managers have strong incentives to avoid negative 
earnings surprises and associated negative stock price revisions is well documented (see, e.g., 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Matsumoto, 2002). Consequently, additional objective 
information would be needed in the marketplace to signal the ability and intentions of the 
management.  
As a solution to these informational issues faced by shareholders and managers during 
earnings announcement periods, corporate credit ratings might act as valuable signals. Kisgen 
(2006) does find that managers seem to view credit ratings as signals of firm quality as 
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evidenced by their actions, survey results and comments in the press; yet, we have little 
knowledge how these signals help shareholders process the information of earnings releases. 
Since credit rating agencies strive to decrease information asymmetry between companies and 
investors as well as providing their views on the future financial performance of the 
companies, the assigned credit ratings should have an impact on the market reactions around 
earnings announcements. Although there are plenty of papers on the stock market reaction to 
earnings announcements and the impact of credit rating announcements on asset prices, very 
few studies have looked thoroughly into the effect credit ratings might have on the 
information content of earnings releases. More importantly, this research has not reached 
consensus.  
The latest research on credit ratings has focused on the significant conflicts of interest present 
in the business of credit ratings.  The conflicts of interest are based on the issuer-pays revenue 
model in which credit rating agencies get their fees from the companies whose securities they 
rate. In line with this agency problem, Alp (2013) finds that speculative-grade rating 
standards were relaxed during years 1985-2002 and inflated ratings made mortgage-backed 
securities more marketable and attractive to investors post-2002. Thus criticism aimed at 
rating agencies following the dot-com crash and 2008 financial crisis was warranted. Even 
increased competition among the three credit rating agencies does not seem to improve the 
quality of ratings as this can result in ratings shopping, i.e., agencies have incentives to inflate 
ratings to gain more business (Bolton et al., 2012). Xia (2014) also confirms these agency 
problems by showing that a rating agency’s rating quality and information content improve 
after the entry of an investor-paid rating agency. Similarly, Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013) 
conclude that independent rating agencies are significantly quicker to identify default risk 
compared with issuer-paid raters.  
Other interesting explanations for conflicts of interest have also been introduced. The fact that 
credit analysts often leave rating agencies to work for companies which they rate is a source 
of concern (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia, 2014). As a result of this conflict of interest, 
transitioning analysts provide ratings that are inflated and less responsive to changes in credit 
risk in the period prior to changing employers. In addition, home bias appears to play a role in 
assigned credit ratings as well when studying the municipal bond market (Cornaggia, 
Cornaggia, and Israelsen, 2014). Compared with ratings assigned by analysts who grew up in 
a different state, analysts who grew up in the same state as the issuer of a municipal bond give 
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significantly more favorable ratings to the issuer. As this effect is not driven by the residence 
of the analyst at the time of giving the rating, the paper concludes that this phenomenon is a 
result of home bias rather than superior information.      
Despite concerns related to conflicts of interest, it is widely accepted in literature that credit 
rating agencies and their ratings do have informational value. This is because rating agencies 
have access to firms’ inside information (see, e.g., Ederington and Yawitz, 1987; Goh and 
Ederington, 1993; Jorion et al., 2005). They have private discussions with managers and are 
provided with valuable information such as projected financial statements, detailed business 
segment data, minutes of board meetings, new product plans as well as plans concerning 
acquisitions, expansion and debt issuance.      
As a result of this informational advantage, in spite of some mixed findings, the importance of 
the information conveyed by credit ratings can be seen in various settings. Naturally, rating 
information has significant informational effects in debt markets. Ederington et al. (1987) and 
Yi and Mullineaux (2006) show that ratings are arguably the most significant determinant of 
the cost of debt. Moreover, in bond and CDS markets, rating announcements convey 
significant information although content seems to be greater in the case of negative news (see, 
e.g., Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Finnerty et al., 2013). There is a similar 
reaction in the stock market as well; most papers document a significant stock price reaction 
to downgrades but not to upgrades (see, e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and 
Ederington, 1993; Norden and Weber, 2004). However, some papers find a stock price 
response to upgrades as well when increasing the sample size or considering new explanatory 
variables such as disclosure regulation changes or the rating prior to the announcement 
(Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Jorion et al., 2005; Jorion and Zhang, 2007). Interestingly, the 
consensus seems to be that non-investment-grade firms have greater reactions to new rating 
information as there is more uncertainty surrounding these entities (see, e.g., Boot et al., 2006; 
Avramov et al., 2009; De Franco et al., 2009).  
In addition, many phenomena in equity markets imply that credit ratings are able to mitigate 
information asymmetry problems. Liu and Malatesta (2006), An and Chan (2008) and Poon et 
al. (2013) demonstrate that having a credit rating, and in some instances a higher rating, can 
reduce the magnitude of underpricing in equity offerings. Chou and Cheng (2012) find that 
the market values diversified firms and diversifying mergers more when the firm’s credit 
rating is better. Rating agencies also seem to have an information advantage over stock 
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analysts (Ederington and Goh, 1998). Thus ratings help equity investors evaluate firms’ 
prospects better.  
Even though the informational effects of ratings have been investigated in various ways, only 
a few papers have used them as variables to help explain the information content of earnings 
releases. Starting from the seminal papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), the 
majority of empirical papers point out the considerable relevance of earnings disclosures to 
investors (as proxied by price and volume reactions). However, this topic remains an area of 
interest as new research is continuously conducted in order to improve our understanding of 
what drives the information content of earnings announcements. Thus far, several factors have 
been shown to affect the informativeness of earnings releases including magnitude of earnings 
surprise, firm size, changes in reporting standards and timeliness of reporting (see, e.g., 
Bamber, 1986; Chen et al., 2005; Landsman et al., 2012). Many studies also indicate that bad 
news have greater informational value compared with good news (see, e.g., Conrad et al., 
2002; Heflin et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2009). 
The relationship between credit ratings and the information content of earnings 
announcements, especially in stock markets, is a relatively novel topic in finance literature. 
Findings from bond and CDS markets show that earnings news are more relevant for firms 
with lower ratings (see, e.g., Callen et al., 2009; Easton et al., 2009). In stock markets, 
downgraded firms experience significant negative abnormal returns around subsequent 
earnings announcement dates (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). The papers by Greatrex (2009) 
and Leventis et al. (2014) are the closest studies to this thesis. They examine the impact of 
credit ratings on the stock price reaction around earnings releases with different data and they 
arrive at different conclusions; Greatrex argues that lower ratings are associated with greater 
stock price responses while Leventis et al. state that higher ratings increase the 
informativeness of earnings announcements. Compared with these papers, my study will 
further investigate this topic using an improved and more robust research design as well as a 
new and larger data set.  
1.2. Background information 
Before proceeding with the study, it is important to review the major players in the credit 
rating industry as well as the ratings they provide. Although there are a number of 
creditworthiness advisory services, the credit rating industry is dominated by the “big three” 
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rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Fitch 
Ratings (Fitch). In 2011, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch accounted for 45%, 38% and 13%, and 
35%, 34% and 23% of total global ratings and total credit analysts employed, respectively 
(White, 2013). Many of the smaller rating agencies rely solely on quantitative analysis to 
determine the creditworthiness of companies but the analysts of the three major rating 
agencies use a mix of quantitative and qualitative models to arrive at a rating (Frost, 2007). 
As Frost explains, both business risk (industry characteristics, company’s competitive 
position and management expertise) as well as financial risk (financial characteristics, 
financial policy, capital structure, cash flow stability and financial flexibility) are taken into 
account in order to produce superior information.  
In addition to an increasing amount of issued credit ratings, rating information provided by 
rating agencies has grown in other forms as well (Bannier and Hirsch, 2010). The three 
biggest rating agencies assign ratings to companies and issued financial securities but they 
also offer additional information through rating outlooks and rating reviews (“watchlists”). 
While rating outlooks provide an opinion on the development of the credit rating in the 
medium term, watchlists focus on the expected rating changes in the short run. Bannier and 
Hirsch state that ratings are usually put under review as a result of discrete corporate events 
such as, e.g., the announcement of a merger or a share buyback, or by trends in a company’s 
operations or financial performance. 
The major credit rating agencies assess the creditworthiness and probability of default by 
assigning ratings to corporations and their securities using an alphabet-oriented rating scale 
(White, 2013). For example, S&P uses a scale from AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, etc., down to 
CCC and then D. In addition, pluses and minuses can be given to all grades from AA to CCC. 
An important distinction can be made between investment-grade or “safe” ratings and 
speculative-grade or “high-risk/junk” ratings. Ratings that are BBB- or higher are considered 
investment-grade while ratings below BBB- are speculative-grade. Different types of credit 
ratings are assigned based on the time horizon and subject of analysis, e.g., short-term and 
long-term issue and issuer ratings. Table 1 provides a general summary of S&P’s letter ratings 
and what they indicate.  
Rating agencies have attracted criticism but the fact remains that they have a huge role to play 
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Table 1 – Credit rating categories and definitions 
This table presents the main rating categories used by S&P as well as their general definitions. The threshold for 
an investment-grade rating is also indicated. Ratings from AA to CCC may be accompanied by a plus (+) or 
minus (-) sign. Source: Standard & Poor’s Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs; retrieved from 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us#def_1. 
 
in today’s financial markets as evidenced by the booming nature of the credit rating industry.2 
Revenues from all the three major credit rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, have 
surpassed pre-crisis levels after the financial crisis decreased the industry’s revenues by a 
third. With Moody’s and S&P achieving record high profits or nearing them it is safe to say 
that the credit rating industry is indeed thriving again. Despite widespread criticism following 
the financial crisis and the emergence of a number of smaller ratings service providers, the big 
three still control about 95% of the global ratings market implying that they provide superior 
information in the eyes of the market. 
 
                                                          
2 Rating agencies: Credit where credit’s due (2014, April 19). The Economist. Retrieved February 12, 2015, 
from http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21601020-ratings-industry-has-bounced-back-
financial-crisis-credit-where.  
Category Definition
AAA Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. Highest Rating.
AA Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments.
Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible 
to adverse economic conditions and changes in circumstances.
Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more subject to 
adverse economic conditions.
BBB- Considered lowest investment grade by market participants.
BB+ Considered highest speculative grade by market participants.
Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to
adverse business, financial and economic conditions.
More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions
but currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments.
Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial and 
economic conditions to meet financial commitments.
CC Currently highly vulnerable.
C Currently highly vulnerable obligations and other defined circumstances.
D Payment default on financial commitments.
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
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1.3. Research question and contribution to the literature 
This study examines how a firm’s credit rating affects the information content of its earnings 
announcements in the stock market. More specifically, to address the main research question, 
I analyze how different credit ratings assigned by S&P, i.e., higher/lower ratings, impact the 
stock price and volume reaction to earnings releases, controlling for the earnings surprise, in 
the US stock market. The paper also looks into the role of preceding rating downgrades. In 
addition, the study will attempt to identify the specific circumstances which render the effect 
of credit ratings more pronounced. Thus I will look into how the relationship between credit 
ratings and information content of earnings disclosures depends on the nature of the earnings 
surprise (positive or negative), amount of information asymmetry surrounding the firm and 
disclosure regulations. To summarize, the research questions of this thesis are the following: 
1. How does the credit rating of a firm affect the information content of its earnings 
announcements in stock markets? 
2. Do credit ratings have a more significant impact on the information content of 
earnings releases when the reported earnings are below expectations? 
3. Is the information content of an earnings disclosure greater when a credit rating 
downgrade occurs after the previous earnings announcement? 
4. Do credit ratings have a more significant impact on the information content of 
earnings releases when firms are characterized by more information 
asymmetry? 
5. Is the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings releases 
larger during the period when rating agencies have an exemption from 
Regulation Fair Disclosure? 
According to my knowledge, this is the first study to provide a more comprehensive view on 
the informational role of ratings around earnings announcements in stock markets. The 
relationship between credit ratings and the informational value of earnings disclosures, 
particularly in stock markets, is a relatively novel topic in finance literature. The most similar 
studies to this thesis are the papers by Greatrex (2009) and Leventis et al. (2014). 
Interestingly, these papers provide different findings. Greatrex finds that lower ratings are 
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associated with greater stock price responses while Leventis et al. suggest that higher ratings 
increase the informativeness of earnings announcements. Greatrex investigates the CDS and 
stock market reaction to quarterly earnings announcements and she examines if the reactions 
differ according to the firm’s credit rating. The study uses US data from the period 2001-2006 
and shows the mean cumulative abnormal stock returns around earnings announcement dates 
for firms categorized by their credit rating from S&P. Greatrex also divides the sample based 
on whether the announcement is a positive, negative or neutral earnings surprise. However, 
the paper does not present regression analysis to further understand the impact of ratings. 
Leventis et al. (2014) look at the effect of credit ratings and timeliness on the information 
content of annual earnings releases based on a sample of Greek firms. Taking into account the 
sign of the earnings surprise and the rating of the firm, they demonstrate the mean abnormal 
stock returns during the earnings announcement period. In addition, they conduct multivariate 
regression analysis to improve the validity of the results although the number of explanatory 
variables employed is quite small. Unfortunately, some factors reduce the robustness of the 
findings; first of all, the study’s credit rating data are not based on ratings assigned by S&P, 
Moody’s or Fitch and secondly, no analyst forecasts are available for Greek firms in order to 
produce the best possible earnings benchmark.  
Compared with the studies by Greatrex (2009) and Leventis et al. (2014), this thesis will 
benefit from an improved and more robust research design as well as a new and larger data 
sample. In addition to analyzing the stock price reaction to earnings announcements, my study 
is the first to examine how the volume response to earning disclosures depends on credit 
ratings. Moreover, I will be the first to pay attention to preceding rating downgrades and the 
overall information environment in order to gain a more complete picture on the 
informational role of credit ratings around earnings announcements. The empirical work is 
based on a larger body of data than previously spanning the period 1986-2013 in the US stock 
market. This paper will also introduce an improved multivariate regression model to answer 
the question: If ratings have informational value, do they derive their value from summarizing 
existing information or conveying additional information?  
Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature related to the value and relevance of 
credit rating agencies and the ratings they assign. More precisely, my study will explore if 
credit ratings can help predict the behaviour of stocks around earnings announcements. 
Consequently, the results should be of interest to investors as well as managers of public 
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corporations as they provide additional insights into the informational effects of earnings 
releases.  
1.4. Main findings 
Based on 81,990 earnings announcements made in the US stock market by S&P rated firms in 
the period from February 1986 to December 2013, I find that credit ratings have a significant 
impact on the information content of earnings announcements. Consistent with the main 
hypothesis of this study, my results show that the information content of earnings releases 
(i.e., the cumulative abnormal return and/or trading volume reactions around earnings 
announcements) increases for firms with lower credit ratings. My findings are in line with the 
univariate results of Greatrex (2009). However, the findings do not support the results of 
Leventis et al. (2014) who argue that higher ratings increase the informativeness of earnings 
announcements. Nevertheless, due to a larger sample and more robust methodology, I believe 
that my results are more likely to represent the true impact of credit ratings. The findings of 
this thesis are in line with the notion that better credit ratings decrease the information 
asymmetry and uncertainty surrounding a firm; the earnings releases of lower rated firms are 
more informative as there is less visibility on the financial performance of these riskier firms 
prior to the announcement. 
The empirical analysis of this thesis demonstrates that the stock price and trading volume 
reactions around earnings disclosures are more pronounced for firms with lower ratings. The 
univariate results present evidence that when firms report good earnings news, mean 
cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes around the earnings announcement increase 
as ratings become lower. In the case of bad news, lower ratings are associated with more 
negative abnormal returns and higher trading volumes. The regression results show that, in 
the event of a negative earnings surprise, a one notch decrease in a company’s credit rating is 
associated with a 0.25% more negative stock price reaction to earnings releases. The 
implication is that if a firm’s reported earnings are below expectations, with a market cap of 
$2B (approximate median of my sample), a one notch lower rating would result in the firm’s 
shareholders experiencing additional total losses of $5M, all else being equal. Furthermore, 
the regression coefficients indicate that, for both good and bad earnings news, a one notch 
lower credit rating results in 0.15%/0.17% more of the outstanding shares being traded in the 
market around an earnings announcement. Additional findings include that lower ratings are 
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associated with even greater market reactions in the case of negative earnings surprises, when 
firms are characterized by a greater amount of information asymmetry and when disclosure 
regulation changes increase the informational advantage of rating agencies. I also find that, in 
some cases, preceding rating changes result in larger market reactions to earnings releases. 
1.5. Limitations of the study 
My research uses a large data sample and a lot of effort has been put into making the methods 
as robust as possible but there are still some limitations which should be considered when 
reading and interpreting the results. First of all, my findings indicate the effect of rating levels 
and thus I do not discuss whether the information content of earnings announcements is 
different between firms with an existing credit rating and those with no assigned rating. In 
addition, due to the nature of the chosen sample, my results are limited to the US stock 
market. It should also be noted that I use ratings assigned by S&P and therefore further 
research would be needed to confirm that the results are similar for ratings from Moody’s and 
Fitch. Finally, the findings of this thesis are based on the chosen methodology. As it is 
virtually impossible to predict the market reactions to earnings announcements, my methods 
might omit some necessary independent variables. With regard to the dependent variables 
which represent the information content of earnings releases, an alternative way to measure 
abnormal returns and trading volumes could also impact the results. Furthermore, 
confounding news during earnings announcement periods might distort my results as I do not 
control for these simultaneous news (e.g., news regarding dividends and management 
forecasts).  
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous 
studies pertaining to the research problem and their main findings. This literature will provide 
an empirical background for this thesis and together with theoretical considerations helps 
formulate the hypotheses, which are presented in section 3. Next, section 4 presents the data 
used in this thesis and its descriptive statistics as well as the methods to be employed. The 
main findings of this paper are discussed in section 5 where empirical results are presented 
and analyzed. Finally, section 6 gives the conclusions and suggestions for further research.   
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2. Literature review 
In this section, I will present relevant previous studies in order to provide further background 
information and a foundation for the formulation of my hypotheses for this thesis. Firstly, the 
informational effects of credit ratings in debt markets will be reviewed. Next, I will go 
through the results when similar studies are extended to stock markets. It is also important to 
summarize what we know about the relevance of earnings releases to investors in general. The 
findings regarding whether credit ratings reduce information asymmetry in financial markets 
are stated as well. Finally, I will review the most relevant literature as far as this study is 
concerned, that is, papers discussing the relationship between credit ratings and the 
informativeness of earnings announcements.  
All in all, despite some mixed findings, credit ratings appear to have a strong informational 
role in various settings. The information advantage of rating agencies seems to be based on 
their access to firms’ inside information (see, e.g., Ederington and Yawitz, 1987; Goh and 
Ederington, 1993; Jorion et al., 2005). In bond and CDS markets, negative rating 
announcements convey more information than positive rating news (see, e.g., Hand et al., 
1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Finnerty et al., 2013). Most stock market studies document a 
significant stock price reaction to downgrades but not to upgrades (see, e.g., Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Norden and Weber, 2004). However, later papers 
show that, when taking into account disclosure regulation changes and the existing rating 
level, upgrades do appear to provide new information to stock markets (Jorion et al., 2005; 
Jorion and Zhang, 2007). It is also well documented that speculative-grade firms have greater 
reactions to new rating information (see, e.g., Yi and Mullineaux, 2006; Avramov et al., 2009; 
De Franco et al., 2009). Moreover, moves into or out of investment-grade are associated with 
larger information content (see, e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Jorion et al., 2005). The 
investment-grade effect comes as no surprise as many institutional investors face restrictions 
to hold only investment-grade securities (see, e.g., Boot et al., 2006; Jorion and Zhang, 2007; 
Kisgen, 2007; Avramov et al., 2009; Finnerty et al., 2013). In addition, higher ratings improve 
stock liquidity, decrease underpricing in equity offerings and increase valuations of 
diversified firms implying that ratings reduce information asymmetry (Liu and Malatesta, 
2006; Odders-White and Ready, 2006; Chou and Cheng, 2012).  
Even though the informational effects of ratings have been studied quite extensively, more 
understanding is still needed regarding their impact on the information content of earnings in 
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the stock market. In general, earnings announcements are significant informational events; 
after all, earnings is likely the most relevant investment variable (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). 
Nevertheless, credit ratings could give investors an indication of when earnings disclosures 
are most valuable. Bond and CDS market studies show that earnings news are more relevant 
for lower rated firms (see, e.g., Callen et al., 2009; Easton et al., 2009). Greatrex (2009) and 
Leventis et al. (2014) conduct similar event studies in the stock market but achieve differing 
results; the former finds earnings announcements of lower rated firms to have greater 
informational value while the latter argue that better credit ratings improve the 
informativeness of earnings disclosures. Further research is thus required to shed more light 
on this topic.  
2.1. Informational value of credit ratings in debt markets 
As the information provided by credit ratings is mainly directed towards creditors, it is not 
surprising that many papers have studied the informational value of these announcements in 
debt markets. Many studies revolve around the impact of credit ratings and rating 
announcements on bond prices and yields in corporate bond markets (see, e.g., Ederington et 
al., 1987; Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Steiner and Heinke, 2001) and sovereign 
debt markets (see, e.g., Cantor and Packer, 1996). The latest literature has focused on the 
impact of rating announcements in CDS markets (see, e.g., Hull et al., 2004; Norden and 
Weber, 2004; Finnerty et al., 2013) and the superior information credit analysts provide to 
bond markets compared with equity analysts (see, e.g., De Franco et al., 2009). 
Credit ratings should contain pricing-relevant information as corporations provide rating 
agencies with inside information during the rating process (Kliger and Sarig, 2000). As there 
is an abundance of publicly available financial information regarding firms, Ederington et al. 
(1987) test whether credit rating agencies add informational value. They examine the market 
yields on industrial bonds and investigate whether market participants price bonds based on 
credit ratings or publicly available creditworthiness metrics such as coverage and leverage. 
Ederington et al. conclude that ratings from S&P and Moody’s contain information beyond 
that provided by financial accounting variables. A later study on the relationship between 
syndicated loan rates and credit ratings achieves similar results (Yi and Mullineaux, 2006).    
In order to more directly explore the informational value of credit ratings, event studies have 
to be conducted around rating announcement days. Hand et al. (1992) were the first to use 
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daily bond prices in order to achieve better empirical results regarding the information content 
of rating announcements. The data sample for the study was based on S&P’s and Moody’s 
bond rating change announcements as well as S&P’s Watch List additions during the period 
1977-1982. The overall conclusion of the paper is that the bond market clearly reacts to 
announcements of rating changes as well as Watch List additions although the results indicate 
an asymmetric response in the case of rating changes. Significantly negative excess bond 
returns are observed for downgrades (-1.27%) but the positive returns associated with 
upgrades are much weaker (0.35%). Moreover, below investment-grade bonds face a 
considerably larger reaction in the market.  
Steiner and Heinke (2001) also examine the price effects of rating announcements in the 
German eurobond market. The main findings are that downgrade announcements as well as 
negative watchlistings result in significant negative abnormal returns on the announcement 
day. However, upgrades and positive watchlistings have insignificant effects. Steiner and 
Heinke propose two explanations for this asymmetric behaviour of bond prices to downgrades 
and upgrades. Firstly, credit rating agencies focus their research on finding negative credit 
information and thus downgrades have more informational value. Secondly, investors place 
more importance on bad news as opposed to good news.  
Kliger and Sarig (2000) adopt a novel approach to study the relevance of rating information. 
Instead of looking at rating changes that reflect fundamental changes in issuers’ risk profiles, 
the paper focuses on the price reactions surrounding Moody’s rating system refinement in 
April, 1982, which introduced finer rating classifications. No effect on total firm value is 
found, but consistent with asset-substitution theory3, bond and stock price reactions are in 
opposite directions. Bondholders benefit from better-than-expected ratings while shareholders 
lose wealth. The effects on both the abnormal returns of bonds as well as yield spread changes 
provide a clear indication that rating information is valuable. Furthermore, the impact of finer 
rating information on bond prices is more significant for firms with higher leverage.          
The market implications of sovereign credit ratings have also been studied (Cantor and 
Packer, 1996). The analysis shows that the impact of rating announcements is highly 
significant. Relative spreads increase 0.9 percentage points as a result of downgrades while 
                                                          
3 The asset-substitution theory states that value is transferred from bondholders to shareholders when a company 
substitutes its low-risk assets for high-risk investments. The potential for added profits only benefits 
shareholders as bondholders only require a fixed return. In addition, the riskier asset base increases the 
probability of the company defaulting on its debt.  
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upgrades cause a 1.3 percentage point decline. Further analysis reveals that the effect of a 
rating change is much stronger for speculative-grade sovereigns than it is for investment-
grade sovereigns. In addition, sovereign credit ratings explain 92% of the variation in spreads. 
The authors conclude that sovereign ratings appear to provide additional information to the 
market beyond publicly available macroeconomic country statistics, especially in the case of 
below investment-grade bonds. 
Due to the significance and size of today’s credit default swap markets, several papers look 
into the information content of credit rating announcements in this distinct debt market 
setting. Zhang (2009), for instance, finds that bond rating downgrades are among the adverse 
credit events that cause the greatest reactions in credit default swap markets. Using a data 
sample of 233,620 individual credit default swap (CDS) spread quotes together with Moody’s 
rating actions between 1998 and 2002, Hull et al. (2004) find evidence of significant increases 
in CDS spreads on announcement days of reviews for downgrade. Norden and Weber (2004) 
analyze the information content of rating announcements by all three major rating agencies 
(S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). Once again the CDS market does not respond to positive rating 
events but negative rating actions by S&P and Moody’s generate positive CDS spread 
changes. A more recent paper presents additional insights on the informational effects of 
credit rating announcements in CDS markets (Finnerty et al., 2013). With the help of a more 
extensive sample from January 2001 to May 2009, Finnerty et al. show that positive credit 
rating events also significantly affect CDS spreads. In general, the information content of 
rating changes is higher for pre-event non-investment-grade CDS contracts.  
The informational value of credit ratings can be studied indirectly by examining the reaction 
to reports by credit analysts who ultimately are behind credit rating decisions. Accordingly, 
the informational effects of bond analyst reports have also been studied (De Franco et al., 
2009). The authors collect a sample of 15,918 analyst reports for 633 firms over the years 
2002 to 2006 and analyze the impact of bond analysts’ reports on volumes and prices in bond 
markets. They find larger reactions to bond analysts’ recommendations than they do for those 
of equity analysts. Furthermore, the bond market reaction is greater for bonds with lower 
credit ratings, which is consistent with greater information demand when a firm is closer to 
default. With these results, De Franco et al. provide additional support for the notion that 
bond/credit analysts, who are responsible for credit ratings as well, provide valuable 
information to debt market investors. 
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2.2. Stock market reaction to credit rating announcements 
The research on the effects of credit ratings in stock markets is even more relevant for the 
purposes of this study. Motivated by the question whether rating agencies provide information 
to the capital markets in general, a vast amount of research has looked into the impact of 
rating information on stock prices. The majority of the papers conduct event studies and look 
into the impact of credit rating announcements on stock prices and abnormal returns (see, e.g., 
Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Yi and Mullineax, 2006; 
Avramov et al., 2009). Boot et al. (2006) take a different approach and present a theoretical 
model which can explain the above empirical findings. Goh and Ederington (1993) elaborate 
and investigate whether the effects depend on the rationale of the rating revision. Some 
studies focus more on variables that could explain the magnitude of the stock market reaction 
such as changes in disclosure regulations (Jorion et al., 2005) and the role of the rating prior 
to the announcement (Jorion and Zhang, 2007). There is also research examining the 
influence of rating agencies’ decisions on future stock volatility (see, e.g., Hubler et al., 
2014). In addition, Behr and Güttler (2008) study if rating agencies have superior skills in 
processing public information in addition to having access to inside information of firms.  
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) employ three different measures of abnormal security return to 
examine stock price changes around S&P’s and Moody’s bond rating changes in the period 
from 1960 to 1975. The main finding of the paper is that the stock price adjustment in the 
month of the rating announcements is significant for downgrades and this is robust to several 
different methodologies. However, while downgrades seem to convey information to 
stockholders, bond upgrades do not appear to have an influence. Nevertheless, Griffin and 
Sanvicente are the first to show the relevance of rating information in stock markets.  
Later research aimed at conducting more powerful tests regarding the information content of 
credit ratings in stock markets by investigating the daily price reactions to new credit rating 
information (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986). Overall, the evidence suggests that downgrades 
across rating classes (e.g., from AA- to A+) made by S&P and Moody’s result in negative 
abnormal returns whereas no positive reaction is associated with upgrades. The event study 
conducted by Holthausen and Leftwich yields significant abnormal returns for across-the-
class downgrades of -4.77% and -0.96% for the contaminated and non-contaminated sample, 
respectively. S&P’s Credit Watch List also conveys information to the market. While 
potential downgrades are associated with negative abnormal performance, in this case, 
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potential upgrades also result in some positive abnormal returns. Additional cross-sectional 
analysis shows that the number of rating grades changed as well as a move into or out of 
investment-grade affect the magnitude of abnormal performance in the case of downgrades.  
Goh and Ederington (1993) argue that the information content of downgrades depends on the 
rationale for the downgrade. To be more precise, the hypothesis is that downgrades should 
result in a negative reaction when the reason for the downgrade is a projected decline in sales 
or earnings; if the stated reason is a foreseen increase in leverage, Goh and Ederington predict 
a positive reaction as it would transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders. The findings 
conclude that the stock market has a negative response when the credit rating downgrade is 
due to a deterioration in the financial prospects of the firm or industry. The cumulative 
abnormal return for days 0 and 1 is a significant -1.18%. On the other hand, other reasons for 
downgrades do not lead to significant stock price effects.  
Zhang (2009) also finds that bond rating downgrades result in significant share price losses on 
the announcement date and research by Yi and Mullineaux (2006) provides further evidence 
that only downgrades convey information to equity investors. Yi and Mullineaux analyze 
syndicated bank loan ratings and demonstrate that excess returns are only associated with 
downgrades but not with upgrades or initial rating announcements. Speculative-grade loans 
face larger stock price reactions when downgraded partly due to information problems. 
Empirical research exhibits a negative cross-sectional correlation between credit risk and 
future stock price performance and a recent study argues that this relationship is mainly due to 
the poor performance of low-rated companies around rating downgrades (Avramov et al., 
2009). As Avramov et al. point out, in theory, since distress risk is primarily driven by 
idiosyncratic forces, the stock returns of low credit risk stocks and those of high credit risk 
stock should be similar. However, their results confirm that the abovementioned anomaly 
does exist in the period of three months before and after credit rating downgrades. On the 
other hand, during non-downgrade periods, the puzzling relation between credit risk and stock 
returns is nonexistent. In line with these results, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) document a 
more significant underperformance of stocks of small sized and lower rated firms in the first 
year following downgrades. This phenomenon is further proof of the informational content of 
credit ratings in stock markets. Avramov et al. also present other driving factors behind the 
observed behaviour around rating downgrades including strong institutional selling, initial 
mispricing generated by retail investors and short sale constraints of lower rated stocks.  
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The pervasive empirical finding seems to be that stock prices react negatively to rating 
downgrades but in the case of upgrades, there is no evidence of a significant response; Hand 
et al. (1992), Ederington and Goh (1998) as well as Norden and Weber (2004) also achieve 
similar results and Kliger and Sarig (2000) even show that shareholders can lose wealth when 
assigned ratings are better than expected since higher ratings mainly benefit bondholders. 
Boot et al. (2006) offer an explanation and argue that only downgrades are truly informative 
events, especially after a credit watch, as they signal that the company has not been able to 
restore its credit quality despite its efforts. These arguments are in line with the thoughts of 
Ederington and Goh (1998) who state that rating agencies expend more resources to focus on 
deterioration rather than improvement in credit quality. There is also a bias toward negative 
information content since companies seem to practice voluntary disclosure in the case of good 
news but they are reluctant to release unfavourable information (Ederington and Goh, 1998). 
Boot et al. also predict that the lower the credit rating, the larger the stock price drop will be 
after a bad signal since the firm is less likely to be able to undertake a recovery effort.     
Recent post-2000 evidence shows that changes in the disclosure regulations for public 
companies in the US seem to have increased the information content of credit ratings (Jorion 
et al., 2005). Even more interestingly, this paper provides exciting evidence that upgrades can 
also be associated with significant abnormal returns. Jorion et al. find that after the Securities 
and Exchange Commission implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in October, 
2000, the impact of rating changes on stock prices has increased. The introduction of Reg FD 
meant that US public companies could no longer practice selective disclose to a few 
privileged parties (e.g., equity analysts, institutional investors) and instead all material 
information should be disclosed simultaneously to the public. However, Reg FD was not 
targeted at rating agencies.4 The rationale was that rating agencies should continue to receive 
selective disclosure as they are not selectively disseminating the information. The empirical 
evidence suggests that credit rating agencies gained an informational advantage following the 
new regulations. The effect of downgrades on stock prices is stronger post-FD with a -6.93% 
reaction in the three-day window around the event. In addition, the mean cumulative 
abnormal return for upgrades in the post-FD period is 1.42% which is significant at the 1% 
level; due to a large sample size, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) also find a significant response 
to upgrades but only of the magnitude of 0.5%. With their multivariate analysis, Jorion et al. 
                                                          
4 This exemption granted to rating agencies was later removed in October 2010 as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9146.pdf; retrieved April 2, 2014). 
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confirm that the size of the stock market reaction is influenced by the FD regulations for both 
downgrades and upgrades.  
Jorion and Zhang (2007) also demonstrate that credit rating upgrades can have informational 
value in stock markets. The authors specifically point out the importance of the credit rating 
prior to the rating change announcement. They argue that lower prior ratings cause stronger 
stock price effects both for downgrades and upgrades. The idea is that a rating change for a 
lower rated firm will induce a much greater change in default probability compared with a 
higher rated firm. The paper confirms these theoretical predictions with its empirical evidence 
from a sample of 1,195 rating upgrades and 361 upgrades between 1996 and 2002. Jorion and 
Zhang find that firms with a rating of BB or below before a rating change experience 
significant positive stock price changes after an upgrade. The difference between reactions to 
downgrades and upgrades is also insignificant in these rating categories meaning that 
upgrades can have as much informational value as downgrades. Overall, while upgrades result 
in a price effect which is 14 times smaller than the effect of downgrades for the unconditional 
sample, the impact of downgrades is only twice as large as far as lower rated companies are 
concerned. In addition, the study shows that the existing rating before the rating change 
announcement is the single most significant explanatory variable when analyzing the cross-
sections of stock returns following a rating change.  
Behr and Güttler (2008) take a different viewpoint and focus on the effects of unsolicited 
credit ratings, i.e., ratings that are not requested or paid for by the rated companies. They find 
that changes of unsolicited ratings result in negative reactions in the stock market irrespective 
of the direction of the rating change. Furthermore, initial unsolicited credit ratings seem to 
convey new information to investors as the stock price reactions are negative and trading 
volumes increase. Since S&P’s unsolicited ratings are said to be based solely on publicly 
available information regarding the rated entity, these results imply that rating agencies 
possess superior information processing skills. 
Instead of looking into the impact of credit rating announcements on abnormal returns or 
volumes, research has also been conducted regarding how rating agencies’ decisions affect 
stock risks (see, e.g., Hubler et al., 2014). All in all, the evidence on this front is mixed and 
conclusive findings are still missing on how credit ratings influence both systematic and 
unsystematic risks. Hubler et al. do, however, show that the certification role played by rating 
agencies is visible in stock risks as well; when a firm has its rating affirmed, its stock 
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experiences a decline in volatility. The implication is that by confirming a rating, the rating 
agency allows investors’ different expectations to converge.       
2.3. The information content of earnings announcements 
As this thesis will analyze the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings 
announcements, I will next look at what kind of results previous research has been able to 
produce regarding the informational value of earnings disclosures. The seminal papers by Ball 
and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) were the first to have a closer look at how earnings 
announcements affect stock prices. Aharony and Swary (1980) investigate if the information 
content of earnings disclosures is robust to contemporaneous dividend announcements. Later 
studies also control for explanatory variables, such as magnitude of earnings surprise, firm 
size and changes in reporting standards to see if they might influence the reaction to earnings 
releases (see, e.g., Bamber, 1986; Landsman and Maydew, 2002; Landsman et al., 2012; 
Crabtree and Kubick, 2014). Moreover, an interesting question is whether there is an 
asymmetric reaction to good and bad news (see, e.g., Conrad et al., 2002; Jorion et al., 2005; 
Kothari et al., 2009). Many recent studies look into the relationship between the timing and 
value of an earnings announcement (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2005; Doyle and Magilke, 2009) 
and Zhang (2009) also studies the effects of these announcements in CDS markets.  
In their paper on the usefulness of annual income reports, Ball and Brown (1968) provide a 
good explanation of why the behaviour of stock prices is important when analyzing the value 
of earnings releases. Since capital markets should be efficient in incorporating relevant 
information into asset prices, changes in these prices reflect the flow of new and relevant 
information into the market. Consequently, stock price movements around earnings 
announcements are likely to indicate the usefulness of these disclosures. Ball and Brown also 
present empirical findings on the stock market effects of earnings releases based on data from 
1957 to 1965. The results derived from an analysis of monthly stock returns demonstrate that 
earnings announcements do possess information content; better-than-expected (worse-than-
expected) earnings are associated with positive (negative) stock market reactions.  
The seminal paper by Beaver (1968) studies the information content of earnings 
announcements in the weeks surrounding the earnings release. The magnitude of the 
information content is examined by the price and volume reactions of common stocks. The 
rationale for the choice of volume as a variable is based on the fact that relevant information 
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provided by a firm should affect the number of shares an investor wants to hold in that firm. 
Beaver’s findings support the notion that earnings announcements possess informational 
value. Mean volume and mean abnormal volume are 33% and 30% larger, respectively, 
during the announcement week when compared with the mean figures for the non-report 
period. This means that earnings reports alter the expectations of individual investors. 
Likewise, the abnormal stock price reaction, irrespective of the sign, is 67% higher in the 
week of the earnings announcement implying that the information content of earnings 
changes the market’s expectations as a whole. 
Further support for the relevance of earnings disclosures is provided by considering daily 
abnormal returns as well as taking into account possible contamination due to 
contemporaneous dividend announcements (Aharony and Swary, 1980). By examining only 
announcements that occurred on different dates within a quarter, Aharony and Swary show 
that both earnings releases and dividend announcements provide valuable information to 
capital markets. Empirical results indicate that when earnings and dividends are above 
expectations, the corresponding stock experiences positive abnormal returns on earnings dates 
regardless of whether the dividend announcement precedes or follows the earnings release.  
Bamber (1986) focuses solely on the volume reaction to earnings announcements and 
demonstrates that trading volume is significantly higher around annual earnings 
announcements. She also finds that the magnitude of the abnormal volume reaction is 
influenced by unexpected earnings and firm size; the trading reaction is greater for larger 
earnings surprises and smaller firms. In addition, the results support the notion that the 
information content of an earnings release increases when fewer alternative information 
sources exist for the firm in question.  
Landsman and Maydew (2002) investigate whether the information content of earnings has 
changed in later decades by analyzing abnormal trading volume and abnormal return 
volatility, that is, the same metrics as Beaver (1968) used, although in a slightly modified 
form. The motivation for the study stems from the concerns regarding the usefulness of 
accounting information as there are doubts regarding the ability of accounting practices to 
keep up with the changing economy. Landsman and Maydew examine the three-day earnings 
announcement event window of quarterly earnings releases over a long period spanning 
almost three decades from 1972 to 1998. The results from the study do not support a decline 
in earnings’ informational value and instead suggest that the information content has 
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increased over time; this is demonstrated by the significantly positive time trend coefficient in 
both abnormal volume and abnormal return volatility regressions.  
There is also compelling evidence that the stock price response to earnings information 
depends on the sign of the earnings surprise as well as the overall level of the market (Conrad 
et al., 2002). Conrad et al. demonstrate that when the market price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is 
higher excess returns become stronger for negative earnings shocks. The results are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that stock prices exhibit stronger sensitivity to bad news 
compared with good news when market prices are rising in general. One way of looking at it 
is that poor earnings performance shocks the market and its overoptimistic expectations. 
Overall, the magnitude of unexpected earnings drives excess stock returns around earnings 
announcements. Kothari et al. (2009) also provide similar findings to those of Conrad et al. 
(2002). They find that stock price reactions to disclosures of bad news exceed those of good 
news. Kothari et al. argue that while good news are quickly revealed to the market, managers 
tend to withhold bad news meaning that the eventual release of bad news is associated with a 
greater amount of information.  
In the same way as Jorion et al. (2005) examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Reg FD) on the informativeness of credit rating changes, Heflin et al. (2003) conduct a study 
on the financial information environment around quarterly earnings announcements following 
the introduction of Reg FD. Despite concerns that the new regulations would reduce the level 
of information in capital markets due to the resulting lack of communication between analysts 
and firms, Heflin et al. show that the information asymmetry or gap during earnings 
announcement periods has decreased after FD implementation. Their event study exhibits an 
approximate decrease of one percent in the absolute cumulative abnormal return during the 
event period. In other words, the information content of earnings announcements has declined 
as the market seems to have more information available after FD was introduced. Regression 
results also demonstrate that the information content is slightly greater in general when a 
company reports a loss.  
A recent study analyzes how the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) has affected the information content of earnings (Landsman et al., 2012). The paper 
compares countries that mandated the adoption of IFRS to those that retained domestic 
accounting standards. The hypothesis is that IFRS should improve the informational value of 
earnings due to the better accounting quality and greater comparability associated with IFRS. 
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The research is conducted with a sample of 20,517 annual earnings announcements from 27 
countries. Landsman et al. present results which clearly show that IFRS-adopting countries 
experienced a significant increase in the information content of earnings announcements. 
In addition, plenty of other theories have been presented regarding what might drive the 
information content of earnings announcements; one area of interest is the timing of these 
announcements. Chen et al. (2005) assess the relationship between the timeliness of an 
earnings announcement and its information content (abnormal trading volume and abnormal 
return) based on data from the Chinese stock market. Chen et al. conclude that earlier 
disclosures are associated with higher abnormal volume and excess return reactions. The 
reasoning is that earlier announcements generate greater surprises as they are less easily 
predicted. Leventis et al. (2014) also look at the informational impact of timeliness and 
present evidence supporting the “good news early, bad news late” hypothesis; good news 
have significant positive information content only if they are released relatively early and bad 
news drive stock prices down especially when they are announced with a delay. Continuing 
with the timing literature, a study on strategic disclosure timing and its effect on the 
informational value of earnings releases reveals that firms’ stocks experience higher abnormal 
trading volumes around earnings reports when the announcements are made after the market 
closes rather than before it opens (Doyle and Magilke, 2009). Firms that usually disclose their 
earnings after market closing have lower earnings and are more complex and thus it is 
sensible to expect that their earnings news will have relatively more information content.  
The recent paper by Crabtree and Kubick (2014) introduces another element that seems to 
influence the value-relevance of earnings releases: tax avoidance. The findings indicate a 
lower earnings response coefficient (change in abnormal return for one unit of unexpected 
earnings) for firms which exhibit greater than moderate tax avoidance. Thus the information 
content of earnings releases is lower for these firms; Crabtree and Kubick suggest that this 
arises from the difficulty investors have in evaluating firms that practice more tax avoidance. 
Earnings announcements also convey information to debt markets (see, e.g., Jiang, 2008; 
Callen et al., 2009; Easton et al., 2009; Zhang, 2009). Zhang (2009) looks for adverse credit 
events in the period 2001-2005 by identifying events that increase daily CDS spreads by more 
than 20 percent and finds that announcements of declining earnings are well represented in 
the final sample. When comparing the informational flows in CDS and stock markets Zhang 
demonstrates that, while share prices drop significantly around news of declining earnings, 
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the (positive) effect on CDS spreads is even stronger. Jiang (2008) shows that rating upgrade 
probability increases and initial bond yield spreads as well as existing bond spreads decrease 
after positive earnings surprises. Easton et al. (2009) document higher bond trade and short-
window returns following earnings releases. Overall, these studies provide further evidence of 
the informational value of earnings announcements in financial markets.  
2.4. Credit ratings and information asymmetry 
This thesis aims to determine whether better credit ratings reduce the informational impact of 
earnings announcements as there should be less uncertainty surrounding these firms. 
Although this particular hypothesis is fairly novel, related literature has studied the 
informational characteristics of credit ratings and how they can mitigate information 
asymmetry in financial markets. The discussion on the potential informational advantage of 
rating agencies and their ratings is often based on whether or not rating agencies receive 
inside information from the firms they rate (see, e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; 
Ederington and Yawitz, 1987; Wakeman, 1990; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Jorion et al., 
2005). Sufi (2007) and Bosch and Steffen (2011) examine whether the certification effect of 
having a credit rating reduces information asymmetry in debt markets; Tang (2009) also 
considers whether the level of the rating has an influence. De Boskey and Gillett (2013) 
analyze credit ratings from a purely informational perspective to see if higher ratings are 
associated with more transparent firms. The informational impact of ratings in equity markets 
is studied by Ederington and Goh (1998) and Odders-White and Ready (2006); the former 
investigate if rating agencies have an informational advantage over equity analysts while the 
latter examine how ratings are related to adverse selection risk and stock liquidity. As an 
analogy to the potential third-party certification role played by rating agencies, Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) analyze the informational role of venture capitalists. Information 
asymmetry is a well-documented phenomenon in equity issues and a few studies explore 
credit ratings’ ability to mitigate problems associated with it (see, e.g., Liu and Malatesta, 
2006; An and Chan, 2008; Poon et al., 2013). Diversification strategies are also often 
associated with information asymmetry in stock markets and Chou and Cheng (2012) research 
if credit ratings can reduce these informational problems. In addition, an interesting paper 
studies if rating levels are related to historical earnings uncertainty (Crabtree and Maher, 
2005).  
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As previous literature on debt and stock market reactions to rating information indicates, 
credit ratings appear to have informational value in financial markets. Nevertheless, the 
presence of mixed findings makes the topic a subject of debate. Wakeman (1990) argues that 
rating agencies lower information costs instead of providing new information and thus ratings 
only summarize existing public information. The main argument in support of the 
informational content of credit ratings and their ability to reduce information asymmetry is 
based on the fact that rating agencies claim to have access to inside information not available 
to other market participants. According to Moody’s and S&P, in addition to having private 
discussions with the management of a firm, they are provided with projected financial 
statements and detailed business segment data (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986). There seems 
to exist a “Chinese wall” which prevents even the firm’s equity analysts from having access 
to certain information which is available to rating agencies including minutes of board 
meetings and new product plans (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987). Rating agencies also seem to 
have access to inside information regarding acquisition, expansion and debt issuance plans 
(Goh and Ederington, 1993). In addition, the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure looks 
to have increased the informational advantage of credit rating agencies even more (Jorion et 
al., 2005). However, Goh and Ederington (1993) state that, at the end of the day, it is still 
difficult to ascertain whether the agencies really receive a huge amount of valuable inside 
information. In any case, rating agencies have advanced skills in evaluating firms and can 
thus provide investors more visibility regarding future performance (Chou, 2013). 
Evidence indicates that the certification effect of credit ratings is considerably important in 
reducing information asymmetry in debt markets. A study on syndicated loans extended in the 
UK in 1996-2007 shows that firms rated by Moody’s or S&P attract a greater number of 
uninformed investors (Bosch and Steffen, 2011). Bosch and Steffen add that the impact of a 
credit rating is larger than that of a stock exchange listing in mitigating information 
asymmetry as the former has a more significant effect in attracting more domestic and 
uninformed foreign investors. These findings are in line with the empirical results provided by 
Sufi (2007). When analyzing the structures of syndicated loans in the US he constructs an 
information asymmetry proxy for a firm based on whether it has an existing rating from S&P 
or not. The results are consistent with the notion that credit ratings help reduce information 
asymmetry between the lead arranger and the participant lenders. More specifically, when the 
borrowing firm does not have a credit rating, Sufi shows that the lead bank has to retain a 
larger share of the loan. In addition, the lack of a rating results in the lead arranger choosing 
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participant lenders that have previous lending relationships with the borrowing firm and are 
geographically closer to it. 
While the studies by Sufi (2007) and Bosch and Steffen (2011) focus on the informational 
effects of having a credit rating, Tang (2009) shows that the level of the rating impacts the 
amount of information asymmetry as well. He examines Moody’s rating system refinement in 
1982 to determine whether a sudden release of new rating information regarding a firm, 
without an accompanying change in the rated firm’s risk profile, affects the firm’s real 
outcomes. Consistent with the idea that better credit ratings reduce information asymmetry, 
Tang shows that compared with downgrades, firms with refinement upgrades face lower 
borrowing costs, issue more debt and increase their capital expenditures following the new 
information from Moody’s. 
De Boskey and Gillett (2013) also present evidence to support higher ratings’ ability to 
mitigate information asymmetry. The results of the above study by Tang (2009) imply that a 
higher credit rating reduces information asymmetry as it signals to investors that firm 
prospects are better and there is less uncertainty surrounding the firm; De Boskey and Gillett 
show that higher ratings are also associated with larger amounts of actual information 
regarding the present state of the firm. They find that higher credit ratings are positively 
related to corporate transparency in the form of public disclosure and quality of earnings 
information. For example, when ranking firms into quintiles based on corporate transparency 
metrics, De Boskey and Gillett report a 1.2 credit rating grade increase, controlling for other 
factors, between firms in the highest and lowest quintile.  
Regarding the informational role of credit ratings in stock markets, Ederington and Goh 
(1998) provide convincing evidence that rating agencies have an information advantage over 
stock analysts as the latter appear to obtain new information from the actions of the former. 
Controlling for earlier negative information and earnings figures announced at the same time, 
Ederington and Goh show that in the first month following a downgrade, there is an abnormal 
downward earnings forecast revision of approximately 5.1% on average. Furthermore, rating 
downgrades also seem to predict declines in actual earnings; Dichev and Piotroski (2001) also 
demonstrate the predictive power of downgrades regarding the deterioration of future 
earnings. Although the effect is not as strong, Ederington and Goh find that upgrades are also 
followed by abnormal upward earnings forecast revisions.  
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In addition, research shows that there is a strong relationship between the uncertainty 
regarding firm value and credit ratings in equity markets (Odders-White and Ready, 2006). 
The paper by Odders-White and Ready investigates the impact of credit rating levels on stock 
liquidity. When asset-value uncertainty is higher, adverse selection risk increases and 
therefore liquidity decreases due to greater information asymmetry. Odders-White and Ready 
explain that adverse selection risk is greater when new information events are more likely or 
when this new information content is expected to be more extreme. The study hypothesizes 
that lower credit ratings should be associated with higher adverse selection costs and poorer 
liquidity. The results support this hypothesis and offer new insights regarding the important 
informational role of credit ratings in the stock market.  
The potential ability of credit rating agencies to certify the quality of firms and securities can 
also be compared to the certification role played by venture capitalists. The certification role 
of third-party specialists has attracted much academic interest and in their study, Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) provide compelling evidence that venture capitalists are able to reduce the 
asymmetry of information between all stakeholders. They explain that third-party certification 
is valuable when insiders of the firm and external investors have differing amounts of 
information regarding the value of the firm. Megginson and Weiss examine how the presence 
of a venture capitalist, which has invested its financial and reputational capital in a firm, 
affects the costs of an initial public offering (IPO) for the listing firm. The conclusion is that 
initial public offerings backed by venture capitalists are associated with numerous benefits: 
lower underpricing, smaller underwriter compensation, higher quality auditors and larger 
institutional following. 
To gain more insight into the certification role of rating agencies outside of debt markets, An 
and Chan (2008) conduct a similar study to Megginson and Weiss (1991) but, suited to the 
purposes of this thesis, turn their attention to the effect of credit ratings in initial public 
offerings. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 5,141 initial public offerings (161 in 
which the listing firm has a credit rating prior to going public) in the US during the years 
1986 to 2004. The main finding is that firms that have credit ratings experience significantly 
lower underpricing compared with firms without credit ratings. An and Chan explain that 
theoretically higher underpricing is a consequence of higher information asymmetry since 
investors need to be compensated as they are less informed about the quality of the issuing 
firm. Although the existence of a credit rating does reduce the value uncertainty and 
28 
 
 
information asymmetry related to issuing firms in IPO markets, An and Chan find that credit 
rating levels do not have a significant impact on underpricing (investment-grade ratings have 
a negative effect on underpricing but the coefficient in the model is not significant). 
Additional results, consistent with the ability of credit ratings to mitigate uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, show that the degree of price revision during bookbuilding and post-
IPO stock volatility are also reduced by credit ratings. 
The first study to examine the impact of credit ratings from S&P on the pricing of equity 
issues focuses on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) instead (Liu and Malatesta, 2006). The 
paper gives a thorough analysis on the effect of credit ratings on SEO underpricing and 
announcement-period abnormal stock returns based on 3,243 US SEOs made in years 1990 to 
2002. Liu and Malatesta find that the underpricing and negative announcement-period 
abnormal returns associated with SEOs are lower for firms with credit ratings indicating that 
ratings reduce information asymmetry in equity offerings. For example, while firms without a 
credit rating assigned are underpriced 3.8% on average in SEOs, the corresponding figure 
drops to 1.9% for rated companies. Furthermore, although not as significant as the impact of 
having a credit rating, the results show that higher credit ratings lower information 
asymmetries (lower underpricing and lower negative announcement-period abnormal returns).  
The findings by Liu and Malatesta (2006) on the ability of credit ratings to mitigate 
information asymmetry are also confirmed by Poon et al. (2013) who study credit ratings and 
Chinese SEOs during 2002-2009. Depending on the model employed, Poon et al. present 
results which show that the existence of a credit rating decreases SEO underpricing by 
11.89% to 14.33%. These results are very interesting considering that the study uses ratings 
issued by a Chinese rating agency as one could assume that the informational content of “big 
three” ratings is even greater. Overall, the abovementioned studies on returning issuers (Liu 
and Malatesta, 2006; Poon et al., 2013) provide strong evidence of third-party credit ratings’ 
informational role in equity markets especially considering that information asymmetry 
problems are less severe in SEOs compared with IPOs since the SEO firms are already well 
known to the market (An and Chan, 2008). 
Chou and Cheng (2012) also contribute to the literature on the informational role of credit 
ratings in equity markets and how they affect the market pricing of listed firms. The study 
revolves around the premise that information asymmetry issues lead to lower valuations for 
diversified public firms. The results, based on 45,140 firm-year observations during the 
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period 1985-2008, suggest that both the existence of a rating as well as a higher rating level 
decrease the diversification discount. Moreover, the beneficial impact of credit ratings is more 
pronounced for firms associated with greater information asymmetry. The ability of credit 
ratings to reduce information asymmetry is also highlighted when Chou and Cheng examine 
the stock market response to diversifying mergers; once again the market reaction is less 
unfavourable if the firm has a credit rating or a higher rating.  
Crabtree and Maher (2005) investigate further whether credit ratings decrease uncertainty in 
financial markets by examining the relationship between ratings and earnings predictability. 
As considerable information asymmetry regarding the latest financial figures is often present 
before eventual earnings announcements, credit rating levels should be associated with the 
level of uncertainty surrounding earnings releases if indeed ratings help reduce information 
asymmetry. Results from the study by Crabtree and Maher support this theory. They use the 
mean earnings surprise (compared with consensus estimate) and dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts as proxies for earnings predictability. Crabtree and Maher demonstrate that higher 
ratings are associated with historically more predictable earnings, i.e., lower proxy values. It 
appears, then, that credit rating levels could have some predictive power with regard to the 
amount of information asymmetry around earnings announcements. 
2.5. The role of credit ratings in the information content of earnings releases 
The main research question of this thesis addresses how credit ratings affect the information 
content of earnings releases. In line with the objectives of this thesis, this section of the 
literature review focuses on what we know regarding the informational effects of credit 
ratings around companies’ earnings announcements. Firstly, it is an interesting question 
whether a firm’s credit rating affects the extent of managers’ earnings management (Jung et 
al., 2013). A few studies have looked into the informational role of credit ratings in earnings 
releases in bond and CDS markets (Jiang, 2008; Callen et al., 2009; Easton et al., 2009; 
Greatrex, 2009). Depending on the paper, they examine how the credit rating of a company 
influences initial bond yields, existing bond spreads, bond trade, bond prices and CDS spreads 
around earnings announcements. Greatrex (2009) is also the first to analyze how credit ratings 
impact the stock price reaction to earnings disclosures. Leventis et al. (2014) conduct a 
similar study on Greek firms. In addition, Dichev and Piotroski, (2001) investigate whether 
preceding rating changes have an effect on the information content of earnings releases. 
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Recent studies also focus on the role of credit ratings in the pricing of future earnings in stock 
markets and if ratings can help explain the post-earnings-announcement drift anomaly (Chou, 
2013; He, 2013).   
Before discussing how credit ratings affect the information conveyed by earnings disclosures 
in financial markets, it is an interesting question whether a company’s rating might change the 
way managers approach earnings reporting. Indeed it does seem that managers realize the 
informational implications of credit ratings and according to Jung et al. (2013) this affects 
their actions around earnings announcements. More specifically, Jung et al. find that 
managers appear to practice earnings smoothing to influence rating agencies’ perception of 
the company as earnings volatility is an important rating factor. The paper hypothesizes that 
rating changes across broad rating classes (e.g., from BBB+ to A-) are more valuable to a 
company and thus companies with a plus or minus attached to their rating have greater 
incentives to engage in earnings smoothing. Jung et al. analyze a sample of companies from 
1990 to 2008 and conclude that plus-notch firms smooth earnings more compared with firms 
with a middle-notch rating. However, this effect is only significant among investment-grade 
firms; according to Jung et al., one reason for this is that speculative-grade firms are more 
likely to experience multiple-notch rating changes. In addition, earnings smoothing activity 
appears to increase the probability of a subsequent rating upgrade for plus-notch firms. The 
study also finds that minus-notch firms do not have higher earnings smoothing and Jung et al. 
argue that this is due to the increased scrutiny they face from rating agencies.   
A couple of papers look into how the informational content of earnings releases is affected by 
credit ratings in the debt market. Jiang (2008) examines the impact of beating earnings 
benchmarks on initial bond yields and how this effect depends on the bond’s rating; the 
benchmarks used are zero earnings, previous year’s earnings and analysts’ forecasts. Since 
lower rated firms have greater default risk and uncertainty, the hypothesis is that lower rated 
firms experience greater changes in their cost of debt after reporting benchmark-beating 
earnings, i.e., the information content of earnings is greater for high-risk firms. The sample of 
the study consists of 1,798 fixed-rate bonds issued by US firms during 1983-2002. Jiang finds 
that, in general, the effect of a prior year’s earnings surprise on initial bond spreads is much 
stronger for lower rated bonds. For example, regression coefficients show that increasing 
earnings year-on-year reduces spreads approximately 25 basis points more for speculative-
grade firms compared with investment-grade firms. The paper also examines the changes in 
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yield spreads for existing bonds around earnings disclosures. The results show that, if the full 
sample is divided into two equal-sized low and high credit rating subsamples, the impact of 
reporting a positive profit is more pronounced for companies with a low credit rating.  
Easton et al. (2009) arrive at similar conclusions regarding the information content of 
earnings in the bond market. They also state that earnings news should be more relevant to 
firms with higher risk of default. Moreover, Easton et al. argue that due to the limited upside 
associated with bonds, negative earnings surprises should carry more weight. The empirical 
research is based on secondary-market corporate bond transactions in 1994-2006 and it 
examines the bond trade and return consequences of earnings announcements. Consistent with 
Jiang (2008), the results show that, regardless of the sign of earnings, speculative-grade bonds 
have a larger reaction to earnings news. Moreover, the information content is greater when 
unexpected earnings are negative. 
Evidence from the CDS market is also consistent with the hypothesis that the informational 
value of earnings news is higher for lower rated companies (Callen et al., 2009). Based on a 
final sample of 9,109 CDS contracts from 383 firms and an event study centered on earnings 
announcements, the study finds that earnings are significantly more highly associated with 
CDS spreads for firms with credit ratings of BBB and below. More specifically, Callen et al. 
report regression results which exhibit a non-significant CDS spread reaction to earnings 
surprises as far as higher rated firms are concerned. 
Greatrex (2009) examines the CDS market’s reactions to earnings announcements as well but 
she also compares them with the informational effects of earnings releases in the stock 
market. Greatrex investigates the CDS and stock price reactions to earnings disclosures made 
by firms between January 2001 and April 2006. The findings regarding the role of credit 
ratings in the CDS market response are in line with the other similar studies mentioned above; 
firms with lower credit ratings are more sensitive to earnings news. In fact, mean cumulative 
abnormal spread changes appear to decrease (increase) monotonically for positive earnings 
surprises (negative earnings surprises) as creditworthiness declines. For instance, non-
investment grade firms reporting below-expected earnings are responsible for the largest 
event window reaction with an abnormal spread increase of 15.5 basis points. Moreover, 
negative earnings surprises have a larger impact on abnormal spread changes compared with 
positive news. Additional regression analysis, controlling for firm size and industry, reveals 
that the magnitude of the earnings surprise is the most significant explanatory variable of 
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abnormal CDS spread changes while only the magnitude effect but not the statistical 
significance remain for the credit rating variable. More interestingly, considering the focus of 
this thesis, Greatrex also presents mean cumulative abnormal stock returns around earnings 
releases and categorizes them according to the firm’s credit rating. She finds that excess 
returns do vary by credit quality. To be more precise, as in the CDS market event study, lower 
rated firms experience greater reactions around earnings announcements regardless of 
whether they contain good, bad or no news. In the case of a positive earnings surprise, 
speculative-grade firms exhibit positive abnormal returns of 1.75%-1.85% while AAA/AA 
rated firms have excess returns of 0.57%-0.70% depending on the model employed. Overall, 
these results are consistent with the notion that higher credit ratings reduce information 
asymmetry in stock markets and thus earnings news are less relevant for firms with better 
ratings. 
Based on a sample of listed Greek firms from 2001 to 2008, Leventis et al. (2014) examine 
the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings announcements as well. 
Leventis et al. categorize firms as “healthy”, “balanced”, “vulnerable” or “risky” based on 
their credit rating obtained from Amadeus. The study arrives at a somewhat surprising 
conclusion as the results indicate that higher credit ratings enhance the informativeness of 
earnings releases. Firms with higher ratings have significant positive (negative) abnormal 
share price reactions to positive (negative) earnings surprises. On the other hand, lower rated 
firms have mainly non-significant negative reactions regardless of the sign of the earnings 
surprise. However, Leventis et al. find that when earnings announcements are associated with 
rating changes, downgrades lead to significant negative reactions for below-expected 
earnings. All in all, Leventis et al. explain the results by arguing that the reduced information 
asymmetry associated with better credit ratings allows investors to appreciate the information 
content of earnings disclosures more.   
Credit rating changes preceding earnings announcements also appear to influence the 
informativeness of earnings releases in the US stock market (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). 
Dichev and Piotroski examine subsequent earnings announcement returns following upgrades 
and downgrades of US firms made by Moody’s during 1970-1997. The entire sample exhibits 
significant negative abnormal performance in the announcement window around the first 
quarterly earnings release following a downgrade. Upgrades, meanwhile, do not have a 
meaningful impact. Furthermore, Dichev and Piotroski show that negative abnormal earnings 
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announcement returns after downgrades are more pronounced for small non-investment grade 
firms and that the effect is observed both in the first and second subsequent quarter. 
Controlling for potential survivorship bias in the sample, the study also demonstrates that the 
underperformance is even greater when only considering firms with at least one subsequent 
earnings announcement missing. 
The study by He (2013) presents a different view on the informational role of credit ratings 
around earnings announcements. Based on a sample of US firms from 1985 to 2009, the paper 
examines the link between credit ratings and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD)5. 
Findings show that PEAD is much stronger for lower rated firms and consequently the 
payoffs from PEAD trading strategies (long on stocks with most positive earnings surprise 
and short on stocks with most negative earnings surprise) are highest when applied to firms in 
the poorest rating categories. He argues that this evidence is consistent with the idea that 
initially, earnings releases by lower rated firms have little information content; the higher 
long-term uncertainty indicated by a lower credit rating means that investors do not value the 
signal of new earnings news as much. The findings also imply that the reaction to earnings 
disclosures of more risky firms is delayed; either investors wait for additional information or 
the processing of new information takes longer.   
Lastly, Chou (2013) offers exciting new evidence regarding the benefits of higher credit 
ratings in stock markets. He finds that the stock prices of higher rated firms reflect more 
future earnings. Specifically, when employing the future earnings response coefficient model, 
current returns of higher rated firms incorporate a larger amount of future earnings. Chou 
argues that more forward-looking information is conveyed through higher ratings. The results 
remain significant after controlling for potential earnings smoothing, market liquidity and 
default risk factors associated with credit ratings. Chou concludes that better credit ratings 
help mitigate information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding the firm’s prospects among 
investors as the ratings disseminate valuable private information.   
                                                          
5 “PEAD refers to the tendency of stocks to continue to earn positive (negative) average abnormal returns after 
positive (negative) earnings surprises.” He (2013) 
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3. Hypotheses 
This section will go through the research questions and hypotheses of this thesis. The 
literature review showed that, although plenty of studies examine the role of credit ratings in 
stock markets, the relationship between ratings and the information content of earnings 
announcements in equity markets is a considerably less understood topic. The limited 
empirical findings on this topic thus far are mixed and even the hypotheses of these papers 
diverge (Greatrex, 2009; He, 2013; Leventis et al., 2014). Due to these considerations, I will 
study the effect of credit ratings on the information content of earnings releases in stock 
markets, that is, how the stock prices and volumes of firms with different credit ratings react 
to earnings disclosures. According to my knowledge, this is the first academic study to 
provide a more comprehensive view on the informational role of ratings around earnings 
announcements in stock markets.        
3.1. Main hypotheses 
The main research question of this thesis revolves around how the information content of 
earnings releases is influenced by credit ratings in the stock market. I will define an earnings 
release as having information content if it results in an abnormal change in the current stock 
price and/or trading volume around the earnings announcement date; these measures have 
been employed in many other papers related to the informational value of earnings 
announcements (see, e.g., Bamber, 1986; MacKinlay, 1997; Chen et al., 2005; Crabtree and 
Kubick, 2014). It is important to consider both of these aspects of information content. While 
a price reaction reflects changes in expectations of the market as a whole, a volume reaction 
means that the expectations of individual investors have been altered and there is diversity in 
opinion among investors (Beaver, 1968; Landsman et al., 2012). Consequently, if investors’ 
risk preferences differ, it is possible that an earnings release might not cause a price change 
but a volume reaction would be observed as many individual investors would find the 
announcement informative. In addition, the nature of the earnings surprise has to be taken into 
account when examining the information content of earnings announcements. If firms report a 
positive earnings surprise, the information content is greater when the stock price and trading 
volume reaction are more positive. In the case of a negative earnings surprise, the information 
content is greater when the trading volume reaction is more positive but the stock price 
reaction is more negative.  
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The first hypothesis is related to the influence of rating levels on the information content of 
earnings disclosures. In general, the empirical evidence presented before indicates that, thanks 
to their access to inside information and information-processing abilities, credit ratings 
provide investors with valuable information and better ratings reduce information asymmetry 
in equity markets (see, e.g., Liu and Malatesta, 2006; Odders-White and Ready, 2006; Chou 
and Cheng, 2012). By assigning a higher rating, the rating agency gives investors a more 
positive signal about the firm’s future prospects and thus there should be less uncertainty and 
more visibility regarding long-term firm value among investors. On the other hand, lower 
ratings increase information asymmetry because without this positive signal investors have a 
harder time forecasting the financial performance of the firm. As a result, I hypothesize that 
higher credit ratings are associated with less information asymmetry in stock markets and thus 
higher rated firms’ earnings releases, controlling for the earnings surprise, provide less 
information regarding the value of the firm. Therefore, earnings news provide more new 
information to shareholders of lower rated firms. Since lower rated firms are closer to default 
and surrounded by more uncertainty, the information conveyed by earnings disclosures has 
greater implications on firm value. 
To provide more support for this prediction, I will provide arguments in favour of it despite 
two previous studies yielding findings which are not entirely in line with this hypothesis. He 
(2013) finds that the post-earnings-announcement drift is observed mainly for lower rated 
stocks. The author argues that this result is consistent with the idea that earnings released by 
lower rated firms have lower informational value initially because investors don’t value the 
signal of current earnings as much due to the long-term uncertainty associated with lower 
rated firms. However, when analyzing the results more closely, the (negative) drift exists 
primarily for firms that report the worst earnings and have a CCC+ rating or lower. In my 
view, it is questionable to make conclusions based on firms which are very near bankruptcy 
and are thus associated with significant informational problems. Moreover, the drift is based 
on a period of two months after the earnings announcement during which other information is 
likely to flow to the market. Based on these two arguments, I believe that the findings by He 
do not contradict my hypothesis that the information content of earnings is higher for lower 
rated firms. Leventis et al., (2014) arrive at a similar conclusion to that of He (2013) with 
Greek data. They state that higher credit ratings enhance the informativeness of earnings 
releases. However, in my opinion, three key reasons render the study’s findings insignificant 
and thus they do not interfere with my hypothesis. Firstly, the sample size is very small and 
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extremely skewed towards higher rated firms. Secondly, the credit rating data are not based 
on ratings assigned by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. Finally, the earnings surprise metric used 
(annual change in earnings) is not very robust; analyst forecasts could not be used as 
benchmarks due to their limited availability for Greek firms.   
The evidence provided by several empirical papers is consistent with my first hypothesis. To 
begin with, higher ratings are positively related to corporate transparency and thus a higher 
rating incorporates more actual information (De Boskey and Gillett, 2013). Jiang (2008) and 
Easton et al. (2009) show that bond prices and yields of speculative-grade firms are much 
more sensitive to earnings news compared with investment-grade bonds. Callen et al., (2009) 
and Greatrex (2009) document the same relationship in the CDS market. In addition, Greatrex 
(2009) analyzes the stock market reaction around earnings announcements and finds that for 
both positive and negative earnings news, the cumulative abnormal returns are larger in 
absolute value when moving from higher rated firms to those with lower ratings. Empirical 
results also demonstrate that stock prices of higher rated firms reflect a greater amount of 
future earnings (Chou, 2013). Therefore, less future earnings are incorporated into the stock 
price of lower rated firms meaning that current earnings have a larger impact on total firm 
value. As a result, earnings releases should have greater information content for firms with 
lower ratings because the announcements drive the value of the firm. All things considered, 
the evidence and theoretical considerations imply that credit ratings have a significant 
informational role in earnings announcements and thus the first hypothesis is the following: 
H1: The credit rating of a firm affects the information content of its earnings 
announcement in stock markets. 
H1a: The share price reaction to earnings releases increases when the firm’s rating 
is lower, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: The volume reaction to earnings releases increases when the firm’s rating is 
lower, ceteris paribus. 
In other words, my first hypothesis argues that lower credit ratings result in more pronounced 
market reactions to earnings announcements controlling for the earnings surprise, among 
other things. For good earnings news, lower rated firms are expected to be associated with 
more positive share price and trading volume reactions. In the event of bad earnings news, 
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lower rated companies are expected to be associated with more negative share price reactions 
as well as more positive trading volume reactions.  
The second hypothesis combines the first hypothesis and the asymmetric market reaction to 
good and bad news. The first hypothesis states that, in general, lower rated companies will 
experience a greater reaction to earnings news regardless of whether the reported figures are 
above or below expectations. In addition, I predict that credit rating levels will have a greater 
impact on the informational value of earnings news when the firm reports a negative earnings 
surprise compared with a positive surprise. Numerically, this means that a lower credit rating 
should be associated with a more pronounced price and/or volume reaction after an earnings 
disappointment.  
If investors value the information content of credit ratings, lower rated firms should have a 
pronounced reaction to bad news. As better rated firms have their long-term health certified 
by a rating agency and their stock prices incorporate more future earnings, current earnings 
disclosures have less implications on firm value. Positive earnings surprises will have a 
relatively small impact on market expectations as more of these expectations are already 
reflected in the current value of the firm. Likewise, negative earnings surprises should yield 
only a relatively small amount of information because rating agencies have provided a 
positive signal regarding the future of the firm. On the other hand, I hypothesize that the 
reactions for lower rated firms are of more asymmetric nature. While positive news may be 
associated with some amount of hesitation due to the long-term uncertainty surrounding the 
firm, bad news should have a significant impact and deflate expectations in the stock market.  
An asymmetric reaction among investors implies that the market punishes underachievers 
more than it rewards overachievers. Many studies confirm this notion that bad news convey 
more information than good news. For instance, the majority of stock market studies 
document a significant stock price reaction to downgrades but not to upgrades (see, e.g., 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Norden and Weber, 2004). Many 
papers also indicate that negative earnings surprises have greater informational value 
compared with positive ones in the stock market (see, e.g., Conrad et al., 2002; Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002; Heflin et al., 2003). Kothari et al. (2009) argue that the eventual release of bad 
news is associated with a greater amount of information as managers tend to withhold bad 
news. Consequently, if negative news convey more information, higher ratings are even more 
effective in mitigating information asymmetry issues. Furthermore, Kothari et al. predict that, 
38 
 
 
due to career concerns, managers have greater incentives to delay the release of bad news 
when the firm is in financial distress implying that negative news from lower rated firms 
convey an even greater amount of information. Overall, these considerations allow me to 
formulate my second hypothesis: 
H2: Credit ratings have a more significant impact on the information content of earnings 
releases when the reported earnings are below expectations. 
H2a: Lower credit ratings have a more pronounced impact on stock prices when 
earnings are below expectations, ceteris paribus.   
H2b: Lower credit ratings have a more pronounced impact on volumes when 
earnings are below expectations, ceteris paribus. 
Next, I turn my focus to the influence of credit rating changes preceding the earnings report. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) show that in the announcement window around the first quarterly 
earnings release following downgrades, firms’ stocks experience significant negative 
abnormal performance. Upgrades, meanwhile, do not have a meaningful impact. This 
evidence is in line with the notion that downgrades increase information asymmetry in the 
market. The prediction is that, holding all other things equal including the rating level at the 
time of the earnings release, a rating downgrade after the previous earnings announcement 
will result in more uncertainty and information asymmetry around the firm. For example, a 
firm with a BB rating for many years should be associated with less informational issues in 
the market place compared with a firm that was downgraded to BB in the previous month as 
investors might fear a further downgrade. The implication is that a more stable credit rating 
reduces information asymmetry. Therefore, I hypothesize that the informativeness of earnings 
announcements will increase for firms with preceding downgrades. The third hypothesis is 
formalized as: 
H3: The information content of earnings disclosures is greater when a credit rating 
downgrade occurs after the previous earnings announcement. 
H3a: The stock price response to an earnings release is larger when the 
announcement is preceded by a rating downgrade, ceteris paribus.   
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H3b: The volume reaction to an earnings release is larger when the announcement 
is preceded by a rating downgrade, ceteris paribus.  
3.2. Additional hypotheses 
As I propose in my previous hypotheses, better credit ratings reduce information asymmetry. 
Empirical evidence from equity markets is also consistent with this theory (see, e.g., Liu and 
Malatesta, 2006; Odders-White and Ready, 2006; Chou and Cheng, 2012). If this is the case, 
one would expect the level of the credit rating to have a greater impact on the information 
content of earnings announcements for firms that face more severe information asymmetry 
problems (e.g., firms with a lower size, more volatile stock, less tangible assets, larger 
research and development expenses, higher leverage, etc.). Chou and Cheng (2012) 
demonstrate that the existence of a credit rating reduces diversification discounts especially 
when firms are surrounded with information asymmetry. I will take this finding one step 
further. In addition to higher credit ratings mitigating information asymmetry around earnings 
announcements (i.e., higher ratings decrease the information content of earnings news) as 
predicted earlier, I hypothesize that this effect is more pronounced among firms associated 
with a greater amount of information asymmetry. Thus I arrive at my fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Credit ratings have a more significant impact on the information content of earnings 
releases when more information asymmetry is present. 
H4a: Lower credit ratings have an even larger impact on stock prices when 
earnings are reported by firms characterized by more information asymmetry, 
ceteris paribus. 
H4b: Lower credit ratings have an even larger impact on volumes when earnings 
are reported by firms characterized by more information asymmetry, ceteris 
paribus.  
The final hypothesis of this study takes into account the overall information environment 
around earnings announcements. In October 2000, Regulation Fair Disclosure was 
implemented. Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits selective and non-public disclosures to 
privileged parties such as security analysts and institutional investors. However, rating 
agencies were initially granted an exemption and would continue to have access to non-public 
information about firms. Empirical evidence indicates that the information advantage of rating 
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agencies increased after Reg FD as the information content of rating upgrades and 
downgrades increased in equity markets (Jorion et al., 2005). In September 2010, as a result 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission removed this exemption 
from credit rating agencies. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether this has actually decreased 
the information advantage of rating agencies in any way as other types of exemptions could 
likely maintain rating agencies’ access to non-public information.6 If indeed the informational 
value of ratings increased during the period when rating agencies had an exemption from 
Regulation FD, then one could predict that this had an impact on the informational effects of 
credit ratings around earnings announcements as well during that same period. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the ability of higher credit ratings to mitigate information asymmetry around 
earnings announcements is even greater during this period and lower rated firms’ 
announcements should convey a larger amount of information. Due to the implementation of 
Regulation FD, I predict that investors give more weight to the signal provided by ratings and 
therefore, lower ratings are associated with even more uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. The fifth and final hypothesis is as follows: 
H5: Credit ratings have a larger impact on the information content of earnings releases 
during the period when rating agencies have an exemption from Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. 
H5a: Lower credit ratings have a more pronounced impact on stock prices when 
earnings are reported during the period when rating agencies have an exemption 
from Reg FD, ceteris paribus. 
H5b: Lower credit ratings have a more pronounced impact on volumes when 
earnings are reported during the period when rating agencies have an exemption 
from Reg FD, ceteris paribus. 
All in all, testing these five hypotheses will provide insights into how credit ratings affect the 
information content of earnings announcements in the stock market, both in terms of a stock 
price and volume reaction. Moreover, they will help determine if the magnitude and 
significance of the effect depend on the nature of the earnings surprise and the information 
environment surrounding the announcement.  
                                                          
6 See, e.g., http://www.skadden.com/insights/sec-issues-final-rule-release-removal-regulation-fd-exemption-
credit-rating-agencies, http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2010/07/19/290701/fitch-to-debt-issuers-dont-cite-us-thank-
you-very-much, http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert_102810.pdf; retrieved April 2, 2015. 
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4. Data and methodology 
Now that the hypotheses have been presented, this section will provide an overview of the 
data and methods to be used in this study. I will first describe how the sample of quarterly 
earnings announcements was constructed. Next, I will go through the methods which will be 
employed to test the hypotheses and address the research questions as well as provide the 
exact definitions for the different variables to be utilized in the empirical analysis. Finally, the 
descriptive statistics of the sample will be presented. 
4.1. Sample formation 
This empirical study is based on data gathered from three sources: S&P Capital IQ’s 
Compustat (Compustat), Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Together, these databases provide information regarding 
firms’ credit ratings, earnings announcement dates, reported earnings, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, stock price and volume data as well as firm fundamentals. The final sample 
comprises earnings announcements made by rated firms listed in the US in the period from 
February 1986 to December 2013. 
The sample formation begins by extracting an initial sample of firms with an S&P Long-Term 
Domestic Issuer Credit Rating in the period 1986-2013 from Compustat’s monthly update file 
for North America. Compustat began reporting these ratings from the second quarter of 1985 
onwards and so my sample begins in 1986 in order to have full-year data. After removing 
observations without suitable rating information and/or unique firm identifiers, this initial 
sample yields 526,726 monthly ratings for 4,775 unique firms. 
Next, using the unique CUSIP firm identifiers from the above Compustat file, data related to 
earnings announcements and analyst estimates is obtained from the I/B/E/S summary history 
file for the forecast period from 1986 to 2013. Variables of interest include the earnings 
announcement date, actual earnings per share (EPS), mean consensus analyst estimate, 
number of estimates and standard deviation of earnings forecasts. Only the latest monthly 
forecast data before each earnings announcement is considered; this ensures that, in general, 
the monthly summary forecast data is no more than 30 days old. After deleting data with 
missing announcement dates and/or actual EPS, the I/B/E/S sample provides data for 124,449 
quarterly earnings announcements and 3,161 unique firms.  
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With the same unique CUSIPs which were used to obtain the I/B/E/S report, I extract daily 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock market data for these firms from CRSP for the period 
Jan 1985 – Jan 2014. This sample is from a longer period as more data is required for 
abnormal return and volume calculations (explained later). I obtain information regarding 
daily stock prices, holding period returns, share volume, number of shares outstanding as well 
as value-weighted market index returns from CRSP. The daily stock market information from 
CRSP yields data for 3,147 unique firms. 
Now, I am able to combine the I/B/E/S and CRSP samples. For each earnings announcement 
date identified by I/B/E/S, I create abnormal return, abnormal volume and stock volatility 
variables based on CRSP data. The combined sample represents 115,988 firm-quarter 
observations (quarterly earnings announcement dates) and 3,039 unique firms.  
Finally, the above observations can be matched with the initial credit rating sample from 
Compustat to construct the full sample for this study. After matching unique CUSIPs and 
dates, credit rating data (rating and possible upgrade/downgrade before announcement) for 
each observation at the beginning of the earnings announcement month are obtained. Earnings 
announcements without rating information are removed from the dataset and the final full 
sample consists of 81,990 firm-quarter observations and 2,765 unique firms.  
In addition, more detailed samples with information regarding firm fundamentals and other 
characteristics are formed especially for the purposes of regression analysis. This data for 
each unique firm from the above final full sample is extracted from Compustat’s quarterly 
fundamental file from January 1983 to December 2013. This longer period is required to 
estimate some of the variables relevant for this study. Compustat provides data for firm 
characteristics such as industry, size, leverage, profitability, earnings predictability and asset 
tangibility. The final detailed sample has 62,788 observations for 2,324 unique firms. When 
preceding rating changes are taken into account the sample size is 62,495 observations and 
2,313 unique firms.  
The entire sample selection process is summarized in Table 2. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the influence of extreme observations. 
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Table 2 – Sample selection process 
The table below shows the different stages of the sample selection process as well as the sources of the data. The 
number of observations and unique firms associated with each stage are also presented.   
 
4.2. Event study methodology 
To assess the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings announcements, 
the market reactions to earnings releases made by firms with different ratings need to be 
measured. Furthermore, to isolate the effect of credit ratings, the reactions have to be 
controlled for other variables such as the nature of the earnings surprise, industry, size and 
other firm characteristics. This is all done with traditional event study methodology 
employing both univariate and multivariate analysis. As MacKinlay (1997) states, the 
procedures for an event study are: (1) Identify the precise date of the event of interest. (2) 
Define the event window around the event. (3) Measure abnormal reactions during the event 
window. (4) Additionally, run a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal reactions on 
characteristics of interest to determine the source of the reactions. (5) Present empirical results 
and arrive at conclusions.    
4.2.1. Measurement of information content 
The stock market’s abnormal reaction to earnings announcements, or the information content, 
is measured both in terms of abnormal return and abnormal trading volume. Both of these 
Criteria
Number of 
unique firms
Number of 
observations
Initial monthly rating sample identified from Compustat for 
years 1986 to 2013
4,775 526,726
Quarterly earnings announcement history and analyst 
information obtained for above unique firms from I/B/E/S for 
forecast period 1986 - 2013
3,161 124,449
I/B/E/S sample combined with stock market data requirements 
from CRSP
3,039 115,988
Above dataset matched with initial credit rating information 
from Compustat to contruct final full sample
2,765 81,990
FINAL FULL SAMPLE 2,765 81,990
Additional firm characteristics obtained from Compustat to 
arrive at final detailed sample
2,313 / 2,324 62,495 / 62,788
FINAL DETAILED SAMPLE 2,313 / 2,324 62,495 / 62,788
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metrics are commonly used in literature to quantify the information content of earnings 
disclosures (see, e.g., Bamber, 1986; Chen et al., 2005; Landsman et al., 2012; Crabtree and 
Kubick, 2014). Abnormal returns and volumes are measured for each day during an event 
window, that is, a chosen amount of days surrounding each earnings announcement date. 
More precisely, the event date for an earnings release (t=0), provided by I/B/ES, is the day on 
which actual earnings figures are announced. As shown in Figure 1, the event window 
includes the 10 days preceding the earnings announcement date and the 10 days following it 
for a total of 21 trading days. Consequently, following Aharony and Swary (1980) and 
Landsman et al. (2012), the event window is the interval [-10, +10] where zero is the earnings 
announcement date.   
In order to detect abnormal reactions around the event date, expected or normal stock return 
and volume reactions need to be estimated. As far as stock returns are concerned, the standard 
method for this in stock market event studies is to employ the market model which relates the 
return of any security to the relevant market portfolio return. Thus the following market 
model, based on the estimation period of 250 trading days preceding the event window, is 
used to estimate the expected or normal return of a stock for each day in the event window:  
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the daily stock return adjusted for splits and dividends for firm i on day t during 
the estimation period, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the corresponding day t return on the CRSP value-weighted 
index and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the ordinary least squares 
parameters of the market model for each event observation and will help determine the 
expected return for each event window day. Following MacKinlay (1997) and Greatrex 
(2009), the market model is calculated over the estimation period [-270, -21]. Chen et al. 
(2005) also use the preceding 250 trading days to estimate the model. A time gap between the 
end of the estimation period and the start of the event window, from day -20 to day -11, is 
imposed so that unusual stock market data, due to possible information leakage, does not 
distort model estimation. For an earnings announcement to be included in the sample, I 
require the event to have return history for the entire estimation period in order to calculate 
the market model. The CRSP value-weighted index is a popular choice to act as a proxy for 
the market portfolio and has been used in many other studies (see, e.g., Conrad et al., 2002 
Liu and Malatesta, 2006; Kothari et al., 2009). 
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Figure 1 – Event study timeline 
This figure provides a visual presentation of the event windows and estimation periods used in this study. 
Abnormal market reactions are obtained from the event window while the estimation window is used to estimate 
a normal daily reaction, both return and volume wise, in the stock market. 
 
Abnormal returns for each day in the event window [-10, +10] can then be calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) (2) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal stock return for firm i on day t during the event window, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the 
daily stock return adjusted for splits and dividends for firm i on day t during the event 
window and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the corresponding day t return on the CRSP value-weighted index. 𝛼𝑖 and 
𝛽𝑖 are the parameters of the market model estimated above in Equation (1).  
For the abnormal trading volume metric, the expected or normal daily volume benchmark is 
based on the average percentage trading volume over the estimation period. This is similar to 
the approach used by Landsman and Maydew (2002), Doyle and Magilke (2009) and 
Landsman et al. (2012). The expected daily trading volume of each stock for each day in the 
event window is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑉𝑖 =  
∑ 𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡
250
 = ( ∑
𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
−270
𝑡=−21
 ) 250⁄  (3) 
where 𝑇𝑉𝑖 is the average daily percentage trading volume for firm i during the estimation 
period of 250 trading days preceding the earnings announcement, 𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 is percentage trading 
volume for firm i on day t during the estimation period, 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the number of firm i’s shares 
traded on day t during the estimation period and 𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares outstanding of 
firm i on day t during the estimation window. As is the case with the expected stock return 
benchmark, the expected trading volume metric is also estimated over the same estimation 
Event 
window
-10-270 0 +10
Event 
date
t = -20
Estimation
period
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period [-271, -21] and the event is required to have volume history for the entire estimation 
window in order to be included in the sample.  
Abnormal trading volumes for each day in the event window [-10, +10] can then be calculated 
as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑉𝑖 =
𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
 − 𝑇𝑉𝑖 (4) 
where 𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal trading volume for firm i on day t during the event window, 𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 
is percentage trading volume for firm i on day t during the event window, 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the number of 
firm i’s shares traded on day t during the event period, 𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares 
outstanding of firm i on day t during the event window and 𝑇𝑉𝑖 is the expected or normal 
daily percentage trading volume for firm i as estimated in Equation (3). 
In order to measure the information content of earnings announcements more accurately, the 
announcement effects are captured in shorter windows. Following Goh and Ederington 
(1993), I divide the event window into different windows: (1) pre-announcement: [-10, -2], 
(2) announcement: [-1, +1] and [-2, +2], and (3) post-announcement: [+2, +10]. In this thesis, 
the focus will be on the announcement window effects as the market reaction to earnings 
disclosures in efficient financial markets should occur over a short period. The three-day 
period [-1, +1] is the standard window in event studies to capture announcement effects and it 
controls for potential uncertainty regarding the exact timing of the event. The five-day 
announcement window [-2, +2] is also often used in related literature (see, e.g., Heflin et al., 
2003; Chen et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). This slightly longer window takes into account, 
to some extent, possible information leakage and/or a delayed reaction to earnings news. 
As a result, the information content of earnings releases, both stock return and volume wise, is 
measured by aggregating the daily abnormal reactions across the announcement windows:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−1, +1) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
+1
𝑡=−1
 (5a) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−2, +2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
+2
𝑡=−2
 (5b) 
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𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖(−1, +1) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡
+1
𝑡=−1
    (6a) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖(−2, +2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡
+2
𝑡=−2
 (6b) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i around an earnings announcement 
date measured across windows [-1, +1] and [-2, +2], 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is as defined in Equation (2), 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖 
is the cumulative abnormal trading volume for firm i around an earnings announcement 
calculated across windows [-1, +1] and [-2, +2], and 𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡 is as specified in Equation (4). 
These four cumulative abnormal reactions will be the dependent variables of this study.  
4.2.2. Univariate analysis 
The univariate results will present the mean CARs and CATVs around quarterly earnings 
announcements for firms with different credit ratings. Two-tailed t-statistics are used to test 
whether mean CARs and CATVs are significantly different from zero. The mean CAR and 
CATV for firms belonging to a specific rating category are as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 (7) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 (8) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 and 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖 are the mean cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes 
around earnings disclosures measured across windows [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] for firms 
belonging to the same rating category and 𝑁 is the amount of observations belonging to the 
same rating category.  
The rating categories are specified in two ways: by the actual credit rating and by rating class. 
The first categorization assigns each observation its actual rating such as BBB+ or BB- and 
thus it considers the possible plus and minus signs associated with a rating. For statistical 
purposes, i.e., to increase the number of observations for a rating category, AAA and AA+ are 
combined into one category; the same is done for ratings CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, SD 
(selective default) and D. This adjustment is justified theoretically as the former combines 
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very low risk firms and the latter brings together firms which are all either in default or very 
near it. The complete list of ratings based on the first categorization consists of 16 rating 
categories: AAA/AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B- 
and CCC+  ̶  D. The second categorization consists of six broader rating classes: AAA/AA, A, 
BBB, BB, B and CCC  ̶  D. In this case, the plus and minus signs associated with credit 
ratings are disregarded and observations are given a rating based on the broader rating class 
(e.g., BBB+  BBB). 
In addition to being grouped by credit ratings as explained above, the nature of the earnings 
surprise is also taken into account in the univariate analysis of abnormal reactions. I divide the 
observations into a “good news” and “bad news” sample following the approach of Jiang 
(2008). Earnings announcements are categorized as good news if the reported earnings per 
share meets or beats the latest mean consensus analyst estimate and bad news if the consensus 
estimate is missed. By taking into account the rating and the earnings surprise, I am able to 
perform a univariate analysis related to the first two hypotheses and examine if ratings impact 
the price and volume reactions to earnings releases and whether this effect differs for good 
and bad news.  
In order to investigate the remaining hypotheses, the univariate analyses are based on 
additional sample partitions; this enables comparisons across different subsamples regarding 
the impact that ratings have on abnormal reactions. For hypothesis 3, I analyze the impact of 
preceding rating changes by partitioning the observations into three subsamples: no preceding 
rating change, preceding downgrade and preceding upgrade. An observation has a preceding 
downgrade (upgrade) if its rating has been downgraded (upgraded) in the last three months 
before the earnings announcement date.7  
In order to examine the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings 
releases when more information asymmetry is present (hypothesis 4), the earnings 
announcement observations are partitioned into low and high information asymmetry 
subsamples based on three information asymmetry proxies. The information asymmetry 
proxies used in this thesis are stock volatility, asset tangibility and market-to-book ratio. 
Firms with a more volatile stock are more risky and thus investors have less visibility on 
future performance. Low asset tangibility firms are more likely to have greater amounts of 
                                                          
7 The influence of the magnitude of the rating change (i.e., how many notches) is not studied as the winsorized 
notch change variables have a minimum value of -1 and a maximum value of +1.  
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intangible assets whose benefits are better understood by management only. Firms with a 
higher market-to-book ratio are likely to be growth firms with more uncertain prospects. 
Stock volatility for each observation is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over the event study estimation period [-270, -21]. Asset tangibility is the firm 
observation’s ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets at the end of the previous 
fiscal quarter8. The market-to-book ratio is measured as market value of equity to book value 
of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. Many previous studies have also used these 
variables as proxies for information asymmetry (see, e.g., Jorion et al., 2005; Liu and 
Malatesta, 2006; Kothari et al., 2009; Tang, 2009). I follow the method of Chou and Cheng 
(2012) and use median value of each information asymmetry proxy to split the sample into 
two subsamples. 
Finally, the full sample is partitioned into three subsamples based on the time period of the 
earnings announcement in order to study whether ratings had a stronger impact when rating 
agencies had an exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. The focus will be on the period 
from November 2000 to August 2010 as this was the period when rating agencies were given 
the exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. Comparisons will be made with the period 
before November 2000 (i.e., February 1986 to October 2000). In addition, I will examine 
whether the impact of ratings on the reaction to earnings announcements has changed from 
September 2010 onwards, that is, after the Reg FD exemption was removed.  
4.2.3. Variable definitions 
Additional multivariate regression analyses will also control for other variables identified by 
prior research as potentially affecting the price and trading volume reactions to earnings 
announcements. These include independent variables related to earnings and level of 
information asymmetry surrounding the firm. In addition, I will take into account variables 
known to be correlated with credit ratings in order to test whether ratings convey additional 
information.  
Table 3 presents a summary of all the variables to be used in the analyses of this thesis and 
their definitions. Unexpected earnings, or earnings surprise, is the main explanatory variable 
                                                          
8 The previous fiscal quarter’s financial figures are the last figures available to investors before the earnings 
announcement for the latest fiscal quarter.  
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Table 3 – Variable definitions 
This table presents all the variables to be used in the analyses of this study as well as their definitions. 
Information regarding the source of each variable is also included in the table.  
 
(Continued) 
Variable Definition Source
CAR (-1,+1) Three-day cumulative abnormal return around an earnings
announcement for an observation. See section 4.2.1.
CRSP & I/B/E/S
CAR (-2,+2) Five-day cumulative abnormal return around an earnings
announcement date. See section 4.2.1. for calculation.
CRSP & I/B/E/S
CATV (-1,+1) Three-day cumulative abnormal trading volume around an
earnings announcement date. See section 4.2.1. for calculation.
CRSP & I/B/E/S
CATV (-2,+2) Five-day cumulative abnormal trading volume around an
earnings announcement date. See section 4.2.1. for calculation.
CRSP & I/B/E/S
Earnings variables:
UE Unexpected earnings for an observation, defined as announced
earnings per share minus mean consensus analyst estimate
(scaled by stock price at the beginning of announcement month).
Compustat & I/B/E/S
BAD Indicator variable that equals 1 when actual earnings are below
mean consensus analyst estimate, zero otherwise.
I/B/ES
Linear rating variable:
RATING Cardinal variable for credit ratings; ratings converted into a
number using a 22-point scale (AAA=1, D=22). The rating
associated with each earnings announcement date equals the
rating of the firm at the beginning of the announcement month.
Compustat
Rating dummies:
AAA/AA+ Indicator variable that equals 1 if observation's rating is AAA or
AA+, zero otherwise.
Compustat
AA Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is AA, zero otherwise. Compustat
AA- Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is AA-, zero otherwise. Compustat
A+ Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is A+, zero otherwise. Compustat
A Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is A, zero otherwise. Compustat
A- Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is A-, zero otherwise. Compustat
BBB+ Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BBB+, zero otherwise. Compustat
BBB Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BBB, zero otherwise. Compustat
BBB- Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BBB-, zero otherwise. Compustat
BB+ Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BB+, zero otherwise. Compustat
BB Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BB, zero otherwise. Compustat
BB- Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BB-, zero otherwise. Compustat
B+ Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is B+, zero otherwise. Compustat
B Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is B, zero otherwise. Compustat
B- Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is B-, zero otherwise. Compustat
Panel A: Dependent variables
Panel B: Independent variables
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
(Continued) 
Variable Definition Source
CCC+  ̶  D Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC,
SD or D, zero otherwise.
Compustat
Rating class dummies:
AAA/AA Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is AAA, AA+, AA or
AA-, zero otherwise.
Compustat
A Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is A+, A or A-, zero
otherwise.
Compustat
BBB Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BBB+, BBB or BBB-,
zero otherwise.
Compustat
BB Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is BB+, BB or BB-, zero
otherwise.
Compustat
B Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is B+, B or B-, zero
otherwise.
Compustat
CCC  ̶  D Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating is CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC,
SD or D, zero otherwise.
Compustat
Rating change 
variables:
DOWNGRADE Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating has been downgraded in
the last three months before the earnings announcement date,
zero otherwise.
Compustat
UPGRADE Indicator variable that equals 1 if rating has been upgraded in the 
last three months before the earnings announcement date, zero
otherwise.
Compustat
High information 
asymmetry dummies:
IA_VOL Indicator variable that equals 1 if observation's stock volatility is
above sample median, zero otherwise. 
CRSP
IA_TAN Indicator variable that equals 1 if observation's asset tangibility
is below sample median, zero otherwise. 
Compustat
IA_MB Indicator variable that equals 1 if observation's market-to-book
ratio is above sample median, zero otherwise. 
Compustat
Reg FD dummies:
FD Indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings announcement is
during period November 2000 - August 2010, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
POSTFD Indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings announcement takes
place after August 2010, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
Control variables:
ANALYST# Natural logarithm of number of analysts following a firm. I/B/E/S
SIZE Natural logarithm of observation's market value of equity (in
millions of dollars) at the end of the previous fiscal quarter.
Compustat
Panel B: Independent variables
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
(Continued) 
 
 
Variable Definition Source
TIMELINESS Difference in calendar days between the earnings release date
and the end date for the reported fiscal period.
I/B/E/S
FOREDISP Analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation 
of earnings forecasts scaled by stock price at the beginning of
announcement month.
Compustat & I/B/E/S
VOL Stock volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of daily
stock returns over the event study estimation period [-270, -21]. 
CRSP
LEV Leverage, measured as long-term debt scaled by total assets
(based on previous fiscal quarter's figures).
Compustat
EARNVOL Earnings volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the
previous 12 earnings per share figures (scaled by the average of
those earnings per share figures).
Compustat
PROFIT Profitability, defined as operating income before depreciation &
amortization scaled by total assets (based on previous fiscal
quarter's figures).
Compustat
TAN Asset tangibility, calculated as ratio of property, plant &
equipment to total assets (based on previous fiscal quarter's
figures).
Compustat
MB Market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity to
book value of equity (based on previous fiscal quarter's figures).
Compustat
Industry variables:
IND10 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is Energy
(GICS sector classification = 10), zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND15 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Materials (GICS sector classification = 15), zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND20 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Industrials (GICS sector classification = 20), zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND25 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Consumer Discretionary (GICS sector classification = 25), zero
otherwise.
Compustat
IND30 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Consumer Staples (GICS sector classification = 30), zero
otherwise.
Compustat
IND35 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is Health
Care (GICS sector classification = 35), zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND40 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Financials (GICS sector classification = 40), zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND45 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Information Technology (GICS sector classification = 45), zero
otherwise.
Compustat
Panel B: Independent variables
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
in earnings announcement studies and its definition in this thesis follows other papers as well 
(see, e.g., Conrad et al., 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Landsman et al., 2012). The variable 
of most interest, as far as this study is concerned, is the variable that accounts for an 
observation’s credit rating. The ratings are based on S&P’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer 
Credit Rating. I define three alternative variable specifications for ratings. First, ratings are 
converted into a cardinal variable measured on 22-point scale (see, e.g., Hand et al., 1992; 
Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Chou, 2013). Second, each rating is assigned a dummy variable to 
allow for more flexible non-linear effects. And third, a dummy variable is assigned for each 
broader rating class (see, e.g., Ederington et al., 1987; Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Jung et al., 
2013). Prior research also identifies other variables that impact the information content of 
earnings releases such as analyst following, firm size, timeliness of the announcement, analyst 
forecast dispersion, stock volatility, leverage, earnings volatility, profitability, asset tangibility 
and the market-to-book ratio of the firm (see, e.g., Landsman and Maydew, 2002; Chen et al., 
2005; Landsman et al., 2012; He, 2013; Crabtree and Kubick, 2014).9 These variables are 
referred to as “control variables” in this study. Many of these variables act as proxies for 
information asymmetry or general uncertainty surrounding a firm and thus potentially affect 
the informativeness of earnings disclosures. In addition, lower leverage, larger firm size, 
lower earnings volatility and higher profitability should all be correlated with better credit 
ratings (see, e.g., Crabtree and Maher, 2005; Yi and Mullineaux, 2006; An and Chan, 2008; 
Jiang, 2008). Controlling for all of these factors enables me to examine whether ratings have 
additional informational impact in the setting of earnings announcements. Finally, variables 
for industry and year effects are also incorporated in the analyses.  
                                                          
9 The following independent variables were also tested but did not improve the fit of regression models: interest 
coverage, operating cash flow volatility, R&D intensity, recession year and fiscal Q4 announcement.  
Variable Definition Source
IND50 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is
Telecommunication Services (GICS sector classification = 50),
zero otherwise.
Compustat
IND55 Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm's industry sector is Utilities
(GICS sector classification = 55), zero otherwise.
Compustat
Year variables:
YEARyyyy Indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings announcement date is
in year yyyy (yyyy = 1986, 1987,…, 2012, 2013), zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
Panel B: Independent variables
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4.2.4. Multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis 
The second methodology of this study is to run cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal 
reactions on characteristics of interest to determine the source of the reactions. While 
univariate analysis shows the correlation of credit ratings with the abnormal reactions to 
earnings announcements, the regression equations will help determine whether credit ratings 
summarize existing market information or if they convey additional valuable information. 
This is done by taking into account other variables (presented in the previous section) which 
might have an effect on the stock price and volume reactions to earnings releases. 
Multivariate cross-sectional regression models are the standard approach when analyzing the 
different sources of abnormal returns and volumes (see, e.g., MacKinlay, 1997; Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002; Chen et al., 2005; Landsman et al., 2012). 
To test the hypotheses, I estimate three different regression equations for each research 
question: a linear rating model, a rating dummy model and a rating class dummy model. 
These models differ with regard to the nature of the rating variable. Table 3 provides 
definitions for all the variables used in the regression equations.  
The linear rating specification of the regression model for the first and second hypothesis (i.e., 
how ratings affect the information content of earnings releases and whether this impact is 
different based on the sign of unexpected earnings) is the following: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
15
𝑘=6
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
25
𝑘=16
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
34
𝑘=26
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
43
𝑘=35
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
70
𝑘=44
 
(9) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 and 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖 are the dependent variables (cumulative abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal trading volume, respectively) measuring information content over the 
two announcement windows [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] for observation i. The independent variables 
𝑈𝐸𝑖, 𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖 are as described in Table 3. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 consist of the ten control 
variables listed in Table 3. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 represent the industry variables presented in Table 3. 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 are the year variables (year fixed effects) as defined in Table 3. 𝛽0 is the constant. 
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Coefficients 𝛽1-𝛽70 capture the effect that each explanatory variable has on the dependent 
variable. The reference (omitted) categories are good earnings news (announcement meets or 
beats mean consensus analyst estimate), Consumer Discretionary industry sector and year 
2013. Every independent variable, excluding year effects, also has an interaction term with 
the dummy variable for bad earnings news to allow for the coefficient to be different for good 
and bad earnings surprises.10 As a result, the total effect of control variables is made up of 
their main effects and interactions with the bad news dummy variable. Likewise, industry 
main effects and interactions constitute the industry fixed effects. 
The rating dummy specification for the first two hypotheses is as follows: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
18
𝑘=4
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
33
𝑘=19
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
43
𝑘=34
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
53
𝑘=44
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
62
𝑘=54
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
71
𝑘=63
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
98
𝑘=72
 
(10) 
where 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 are the rating dummy variables as defined in Table 3. The reference 
category for the rating dummy variables is AAA/AA+ rated observations. All other variables 
are as described in connection with Equation (9).  
The rating class dummy specification of the regression model for hypotheses 1 and 2 is 
estimated with the following equation: 
                                                          
10 The inclusion of these interaction terms is very important since the explanatory variables, if indeed proxies for 
information asymmetry, potentially exhibit opposite effects for good and bad news when the dependent variable 
is the abnormal price reaction. For good earnings news, the information content is greater when the abnormal 
stock return is higher whereas for negative news, information content increases when the abnormal stock price 
reaction is more negative.  
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 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
8
𝑘=4
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
13
𝑘=9
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
23
𝑘=14
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
33
𝑘=24
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
42
𝑘=34
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
51
𝑘=43
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
78
𝑘=52
 
(11) 
where 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 are the rating class dummy variables as defined in Table 3. 
The reference category for the rating class dummy variables is firms with a rating from AAA 
to AA-. All other variables are as described in connection with Equation (9). 
Hypothesis 3 addresses the impact of preceding rating changes, downgrades specifically, on 
the abnormal reactions to earnings releases. In order to test this hypothesis, I add rating 
change variables to the previous regression models. For brevity, only the regression model 
with the linear rating variable is presented as the other two equations differ only with regard 
to the rating specification. The regression equation with the linear rating specification for the 
third hypothesis is: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽8(𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽9(𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
19
𝑘=10
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
29
𝑘=20
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
38
𝑘=30
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
47
𝑘=39
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
74
𝑘=48
 
(12) 
where 𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 and 𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 are the rating change variables as defined in Table 3. 
An interaction with bad earnings news is also included for the rating change variables. The 
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reference category for the rating change indicator variables is observations with no preceding 
rating change. All other variables are as described in connection with Equation (9). 
The influence of information asymmetry on the informational effect of credit ratings is 
discussed in the fourth hypothesis. Therefore, the new regression models incorporate 
information asymmetry dummy variables which control for high information asymmetry 
firms. For brevity, only the regression model with the linear rating variable is presented. The 
regression equation with the linear rating specification for hypothesis 4 is the following: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽8(𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽9(𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖(𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑀𝐵𝑖)
+ 𝛽11[𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑀𝐵) ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷]𝑖
+ 𝛽12[𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑀𝐵)]𝑖
+ 𝛽13[𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐴_𝑀𝐵) ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷]𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
23
𝑘=14
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
33
𝑘=24
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
42
𝑘=34
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
51
𝑘=43
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
78
𝑘=52
 
(13) 
where 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖, 𝐼𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖 and 𝐼𝐴_𝑀𝐵𝑖 are dummy variables for high information asymmetry 
as defined in Table 3. The reference category for the information asymmetry indicator 
variable is observations with low information asymmetry (below or above sample median 
depending on variable). The focus in this model is on the two-way interaction between the 
rating variable and the information asymmetry dummy variable as well as the three-way 
interaction between the rating variable, information asymmetry dummy variable and bad 
earnings news dummy variable. The two-way interaction coefficient indicates the incremental 
effect that ratings have in the case of high information asymmetry firms. The coefficient of 
the three-way interaction term points out whether the two-way interaction above is different 
for observations with negative earnings news. All other variables are as described in 
connection with Equation (9) or Equation (12). 
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The last hypothesis takes into account the time period of quarterly earnings announcements to 
study whether rating agencies’ exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure increased the 
impact of ratings on the information content of earnings disclosures. Consequently, the last 
regression models also include time period dummy variables. For brevity, only the regression 
model with the linear rating variable is presented. The regression equation with the linear 
rating specification for hypothesis 5 is as follows: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽8(𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽9(𝑈𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽12(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿)𝑖
+ 𝛽13(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐹𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽15(𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
+ 𝛽16(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐹𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽17(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽18𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽19(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + 𝛽20(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐷)𝑖
+ 𝛽21(𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
31
𝑘=22
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
41
𝑘=32
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
50
𝑘=42
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝐷)𝑖
59
𝑘=51
 
(14) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝑖 and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐷𝑖 are as defined in Table 3. While the former refers to the period 
when rating agencies had an exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure, I also investigate if 
the impact of ratings has changed after the removal of the exemption with the latter variable. 
The reference category for the time period indicator variable is observations before November 
2000. The interpretations of the additional interaction terms are similar to those in Equation 
(13). For brevity, only 𝐼𝐴_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 is used as the high information asymmetry dummy variable.
11 
In addition, year fixed effects are excluded as the Reg FD dummy variables control for time 
effects. All other variables are as described in connection with Equation (9), Equation (12) or 
Equation (13). 
                                                          
11 Subsequent results are qualitatively similar regardless of the information asymmetry dummy variable used.  
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Table 4 – Distribution of credit ratings and preceding rating changes 
Panel A presents the distribution of firms’ credit ratings at the time of earnings announcements. The cardinal 
measure associated with each rating which is used to construct the linear rating variable is also shown. Panel B 
presents the distribution of possible rating changes in the last three months before earnings announcements.  
 
Two-tailed t-statistics are used to test the significance of the coefficients of the regression 
models presented in this section. To control for potential concerns related to 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, all t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
S&P credit rating Cardinal scale Number of observations Percentage (%)
AAA 1 943 1.15
AA+ 2 516 0.63
AA 3 1,808 2.21
AA- 4 2,117 2.58
A+ 5 4,201 5.12
A 6 7,695 9.39
A- 7 6,279 7.66
BBB+ 8 7,303 8.91
BBB 9 10,404 12.69
BBB- 10 8,016 9.78
BB+ 11 4,924 6.01
BB 12 6,590 8.04
BB- 13 8,147 9.94
B+ 14 6,964 8.49
B 15 3,575 4.36
B- 16 1,726 2.11
CCC+ 17 452 0.55
CCC 18 189 0.23
CCC- 19 41 0.05
CC 20 32 0.04
SD or D 22 68 0.08
Total 81,990 100.00
Number of observations Percentage (%)
76,681 94.04
2,681 3.29
2,180 2.67
81,542 100.00
Panel A: Distribution of credit ratings for firms announcing earnings
Total
No rating change
Downgrade
Upgrade
Preceding rating change
Panel B: Distribution of rating changes before an earnings announcement
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4.3. Descriptive statistics of data 
Before proceeding to the univariate and multivariate analyses in the next section, I will 
present the summary statistics of the data sample which is based on 81,990 quarterly earnings 
announcements made by US listed firms with existing credit ratings.  
The distribution of credit ratings for the full sample period of Feb 1986 – Dec 2013 is 
presented in Table 4. Since I study the impact of ratings on the information content of 
earnings releases, these ratings represent firms’ ratings at the time of earnings 
announcements, or at the beginning of the announcement month, to be more exact. The 
predictor variables related to ratings are the focus of this study. The ratings are the Long-
Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating issued by S&P. This represents a current opinion of an 
issuer's overall creditworthiness and focuses on the obligor's capacity and willingness to meet 
its long-term financial commitments. Ratings vary from AAA (lowest risk) to default ratings 
D or SD (selective default). Only observations from rating category C are missing. The 
majority of observations fall within levels from A to B+ with BBB accounting for the highest 
percentage (12.69%). Overall, speculative-grade (rating below BBB-) firms are well 
represented but the number of observations is considerably lower for ratings CCC+ and 
below. Therefore, excluding analyses with the linear rating variable, these high-risk/default 
ratings are combined into one group. AAA ratings are also combined with adjacent rating 
levels for statistical purposes. In total, the sample consists of 81,990 earnings releases made 
by firms with credit ratings. Table 4 also shows the amount of rating changes that took place 
in the three months preceding an earnings announcement. Rating agencies aim to avoid 
making an excessive amount of rating revisions and rather focus on stable long-term rating 
changes. Thus it is no surprise that the 94% of earnings announcements are not preceded by a 
rating change. 3.29% and 2.67% of observations are associated with a preceding downgrade 
and upgrade, respectively. The number of rating change observations is lower because some 
earnings announcements are missing rating information from prior months.   
Table 5 exhibits the sample composition for each year, fiscal quarter and industry. Panel A 
shows that the total earnings announcements are evenly distributed between fiscal quarters 
with each quarter accounting for over 20,000 observations and approximately 25% of the 
sample. All years from 1986 to 2013 provide a decent number of observations. The increasing 
trend of quarterly earnings announcements across time is expected as the number of rated  
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Table 5 – Sample composition by year, fiscal quarter and industry 
Panel A presents the distribution of earnings announcements by year and fiscal quarter. Panel B shows the 
sample composition by industry based on GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes.  
  
Year Fiscal Q1 Fiscal Q2 Fiscal Q3 Fiscal Q4 Total Percentage (%)
1986 289 284 301 85 959 1.17
1987 339 343 333 336 1,351 1.65
1988 285 291 314 305 1,195 1.46
1989 376 411 425 380 1,592 1.94
1990 368 356 331 391 1,446 1.76
1991 369 390 447 413 1,619 1.97
1992 355 398 420 432 1,605 1.96
1993 493 510 536 491 2,030 2.48
1994 552 585 592 574 2,303 2.81
1995 607 619 631 611 2,468 3.01
1996 653 680 692 676 2,701 3.29
1997 705 739 733 719 2,896 3.53
1998 763 785 819 808 3,175 3.87
1999 819 851 851 844 3,365 4.10
2000 807 855 777 832 3,271 3.99
2001 802 857 852 833 3,344 4.08
2002 849 862 882 851 3,444 4.20
2003 877 899 923 885 3,584 4.37
2004 937 947 950 938 3,772 4.60
2005 948 949 946 958 3,801 4.64
2006 959 968 962 959 3,848 4.69
2007 973 985 975 962 3,895 4.75
2008 972 963 968 995 3,898 4.75
2009 955 966 969 962 3,852 4.70
2010 990 996 1,008 986 3,980 4.85
2011 1,012 1,028 1,040 1,010 4,090 4.99
2012 1,035 1,057 997 1,046 4,135 5.04
2013 1,081 1,106 1,114 1,070 4,371 5.33
Total 20,170 20,680 20,788 20,352 81,990 100.00
Percentage (%) 24.60 25.22 25.35 24.82 100.00
Industry sector 2-digit GICS                    Number of observations Percentage (%)      
Consumer Discretionary 25
Consumer Staples 30
Energy 10
Financials 40
Health Care 35
Industrials 20
Information Technology 45
Materials 15
Telecommunication Services 50
Utilities 55
Total
1,712
4,854
81,990
15,062
5,502
7,513
14,849
6,277
9.46
2.09
5.92
100.00
Panel A: Distribution of earnings announcements per year and fiscal quarter
Panel B: Sample composition by industry
18.37
6.71
9.16
18.11
7.66
14.6912,041
6,426 7.84
7,754
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Table 6 – Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Below are the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables employed in this study. The first four variables 
represent the dependent variables of this study while the rest are independent variables. The definitions for the 
variables can be found in Table 3. All of the below variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.   
 
firms and firms in general have increased over time. Panel B reports the sample distribution 
by industry. Firms operating in the consumer discretionary, financial and industrial sector 
have the highest amount of observations. All other industries are also well represented with 
telecommunication services perhaps being an exception. All in all, the industry breakdown is 
consistent with the overall representation of industries on US stock exchanges.  
Table 6 summarizes the remaining variables used in the analyses. The average (median) 
cumulative abnormal return around earnings announcements is 0.2% (0.1%) for both 
windows while the figure for cumulative abnormal trading volume is 1.3% or 1.6% (0.4% or 
0.5%). These figures imply that while there is always information content in earnings releases 
based on the volume metric, the price reaction depends on whether the announcement 
conveys good or bad news. It seems that in the long run, positive and negative earnings 
announcements are quite evenly distributed and news are as expected as the average and 
median cumulative abnormal return are both close to zero. The statistics for the explanatory 
variable related to unexpected earnings confirm this; the median earnings surprise is zero 
percent. Based on the median, the typical firm in my sample has a market cap of slightly over 
$2B (e7.682). The number of observations varies depending on the availability of information 
regarding an explanatory variable.   
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl.
CAR (-1,+1) 81,990 0.002 0.063 -0.027 0.001 0.032
CAR (-2,+2) 81,990 0.002 0.072 -0.032 0.001 0.037
CATV (-1,+1) 81,990 0.013 0.027 -0.001 0.004 0.017
CATV (-2,+2) 81,990 0.016 0.035 -0.002 0.005 0.021
UE 81,862 -0.001 0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.001
ANALYST# 81,990 1.959 0.842 1.386 2.079 2.565
SIZE 81,604 7.670 1.592 6.596 7.628 8.710
TIMELINESS 81,990 28.923 11.312 21.000 27.000 35.000
FOREDISP 76,714 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.002
VOL 81,990 0.025 0.013 0.016 0.021 0.030
LEV 81,555 0.280 0.192 0.136 0.255 0.385
EARNVOL 75,516 2.378 5.916 0.314 0.640 1.784
PROFIT 73,443 0.032 0.022 0.018 0.031 0.045
TAN 77,854 0.324 0.260 0.098 0.267 0.526
MB 81,146 2.581 3.434 1.293 1.944 3.090
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5. Results and analysis 
This section will go through the results of this thesis based on the data and methodology 
presented in the previous section. I will first review the univariate results for each hypothesis 
to see if a relationship exists between credit ratings and the information content of earnings 
announcements. In order to increase the robustness of the results, multivariate regression 
analyses will follow and provide additional evidence on whether credit ratings are able to 
explain the differing market reactions to earnings releases.   
5.1. Univariate evidence 
5.1.1. Impact of credit rating levels on the market reaction to earnings releases 
Figure 2 shows the mean daily abnormal reactions around earnings announcements for each 
credit rating class. In general, we see that there are spikes in abnormal returns and trading 
volumes at the time of earnings releases across all rating classes. However, the key takeaway 
is that lower (and riskier) ratings are associated with greater reactions around earnings 
disclosures. This is true in the cases of positive and negative earnings surprises for both 
abnormal returns and trading volumes. When a company reports good earnings news, 
companies with worse credit ratings experience greater market reactions. The reaction is 
similar with bad earnings news as firms with lower ratings see larger share price declines as 
well as greater increases in the stock’s trading volume. This evidence seems to indicate that 
the information content of earnings announcements increases when the credit rating of a 
company is lower. Excluding the lowest rating class, i.e., CCC – D, there seem to be no 
significant reactions in the pre- and post-announcement periods. Since firms with the lowest 
ratings are generally considered the most risky firms, it is no surprise to see the more volatile 
nature of these stocks.  
These findings are confirmed in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 which give a more comprehensive view 
on the relationship between credit rating levels and the information content of earnings 
announcements. They aim to provide insights into how the three- and five-day abnormal 
returns and trading volumes, i.e., the information content of earnings releases, might be 
affected by firms’ credit rating levels. The results take into account the nature of the earnings 
surprise, that is, whether the reported earnings are considered good or bad news. In addition, 
two different ways to categorize ratings are considered. 
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Figure 2 – Daily abnormal reactions around earnings announcements by credit rating 
These figures present the mean daily (percentage) abnormal returns and trading volumes around earnings 
releases per each rating class, in the case of good and bad earnings news, over the [-10,+10] time interval (t=0 
signifies announcement date). Abnormal return and trading volume are as defined in section 4.2.1. while good 
and bad news as well as rating categories are defined in section 4.2.2. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal returns in the case of good news
Panel B: Abnormal returns in the case of bad news
Panel C: Abnormal trading volumes in the case of good news
Panel D: Abnormal trading volumes in the case of bad news
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Table 7 – Cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements for good news 
This table provides the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around earnings releases per 
rating category over the [-10,-2], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [+2,+10] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date) in 
the case of good earnings news. CAR is as defined in section 4.2.1. while good news and rating categories are 
defined in section 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based 
on (untabulated) two-tailed t-statistics. 
 
Table 7 exhibits evidence that, in the case of good earnings news, announcement window 
mean cumulative abnormal returns have a tendency to increase when the credit rating of the 
company is lower. This is true for both the [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] announcement windows. With 
the rating class categorization, the relationship is strictly monotonic. As far as the three-day 
announcement window is concerned, the mean abnormal reactions range from 0.628% (AA- 
rating) to 2.285% (CCC+ - D rating). All three- and five-day mean cumulative abnormal  
N (-10,-2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (+2,+10)
Panel A: By credit rating
All 53,866 0.126*** 1.227*** 1.310*** 0.087***
AAA/AA+ 972 0.124 0.651*** 0.740*** 0.146
AA 1,195 0.148 0.679*** 0.753*** 0.080
AA- 1,397 -0.137 0.628*** 0.668*** 0.440***
A+ 2,919 0.163** 0.718*** 0.872*** 0.247***
A 5,336 0.020 0.866*** 0.967*** 0.317***
A- 4,240 -0.022 0.851*** 0.921*** 0.211***
BBB+ 4,948 0.026 0.892*** 0.982*** 0.221***
BBB 6,971 0.130** 1.055*** 1.086*** 0.173***
BBB- 5,419 0.000 1.108*** 1.150*** 0.200***
BB+ 3,285 0.135 1.402*** 1.519*** -0.114
BB 4,425 0.138 1.688*** 1.741*** 0.058
BB- 5,269 0.017* 1.726*** 1.788*** -0.122
B+ 4,250 0.447*** 1.795*** 2.013*** -0.190
B 1,984 0.336* 2.074*** 1.994*** -0.330
B- 927 0.201 2.190*** 2.426*** -0.664**
CCC+  ̶  D 329 1.484** 2.285*** 2.652*** 0.028
Panel B: By credit rating class
All 53,866 0.126*** 1.227*** 1.310*** 0.087***
AAA/AA 3,564 0.030 0.652*** 0.716*** 0.239***
A 12,495 0.039 0.826*** 0.929*** 0.265***
BBB 17,338 0.060 1.025*** 1.077*** 0.195***
BB 12,979 0.150** 1.631*** 1.704*** -0.059
B 7,161 0.385*** 1.923*** 2.061*** -0.290***
CCC  ̶  D 329 1.484** 2.285*** 2.652*** 0.028
Mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) (%)
66 
 
 
Table 8 – Cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements for bad news 
This table reports the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around earnings releases per rating 
category over the [-10,-2], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [+2,+10] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date) in the case 
of bad earnings news. CAR is as defined in section 4.2.1. while bad news and rating categories are defined in 
section 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
(untabulated) two-tailed t-statistics. 
 
returns are statistically significant at the 1% level. For good earnings news, the three-day 
mean cumulative abnormal return for the entire sample is 1.227%. 
The influence of credit ratings appears to be as hypothesized also in the case of bad earnings 
news based on Table 8. The share price reaction more or less increases when the rating is 
lower and the relationship is strictly monotonic when looking at rating classes.  The 
information content of negative earnings surprises is greater for lower rated firms and thus  
N (-10,-2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (+2,+10)
Panel A: By credit rating
All 28,124 -0.409*** -1.730*** -1.857*** -0.036
AAA/AA+ 487 -0.560*** -1.006*** -1.111*** 0.310
AA 613 -0.756*** -0.999*** -1.243*** -0.135
AA- 720 -0.463** -0.760*** -1.027*** 0.053
A+ 1,282 -0.657*** -1.189*** -1.227*** 0.202
A 2,359 -0.445*** -1.193*** -1.294*** 0.183*
A- 2,039 -0.313*** -1.153*** -1.166*** -0.042
BBB+ 2,355 -0.509*** -1.195*** -1.309*** -0.083
BBB 3,433 -0.401*** -1.575*** -1.690*** -0.037
BBB- 2,597 -0.073 -1.732*** -1.890*** -0.094
BB+ 1,639 -0.435*** -1.809*** -2.090*** -0.146
BB 2,165 -0.784*** -1.956*** -2.143*** -0.042
BB- 2,878 -0.467*** -2.261*** -2.298*** 0.185
B+ 2,714 -0.161 -2.381*** -2.565*** -0.251
B 1,591 -0.737*** -2.334*** -2.495*** -0.291
B- 799 0.007 -3.013*** -3.034*** -0.411
CCC+  ̶  D 453 0.480 -2.880*** -3.000*** 0.285
Panel B: By credit rating class
All 28,124 -0.409*** -1.730*** -1.857*** -0.036
AAA/AA 1,820 -0.588*** -0.907*** -1.123*** 0.059
A 5,680 -0.445*** -1.178*** -1.233*** 0.106
BBB 8,385 -0.330*** -1.517*** -1.645*** -0.068
BB 6,682 -0.562*** -2.051*** -2.197*** 0.030
B 5,104 -0.314** -2.468*** -2.616*** -0.288**
CCC  ̶  D 453 0.480 -2.880*** -3.000*** 0.285
Mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) (%)
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Table 9 – Cumulative abnormal trading volume around earnings releases for good news 
This table presents the mean percentage cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) around earnings 
releases per rating category over the [-10,-2], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [+2,+10] time intervals (t=0 signifies 
announcement date) in the case of good earnings news. CATV is as defined in section 4.2.1. while good news 
and rating categories are defined in section 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively, based on (untabulated) two-tailed t-statistics. 
 
they experience larger share price declines. For the [-1, +1] window, the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns range from -0.760% (AA- rating) to -3.013% (B- rating). All three- and 
five-day abnormal reactions are statistically significant at the 1% level. For bad earnings 
news, the three-day mean cumulative abnormal return for the entire sample is -1.730%. 
The results are qualitatively similar when looking at trading volume reactions. Table 9 
demonstrates that good earnings news result in greater increases in trading volume when the  
N (-10,-2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (+2,+10)
Panel A: By credit rating
All 53,866 -0.338*** 1.333*** 1.549*** 0.562***
AAA/AA+ 972 -0.090* 0.372*** 0.423*** 0.099**
AA 1,195 -0.071 0.334*** 0.394*** 0.143***
AA- 1,397 -0.044 0.432*** 0.494*** 0.181***
A+ 2,919 -0.072** 0.633*** 0.741*** 0.224***
A 5,336 -0.078*** 0.717*** 0.838*** 0.290***
A- 4,240 -0.184*** 0.735*** 0.839*** 0.289***
BBB+ 4,948 -0.171*** 0.922*** 1.088*** 0.453***
BBB 6,971 -0.247*** 1.067*** 1.246*** 0.480***
BBB- 5,419 -0.365*** 1.458*** 1.685*** 0.617***
BB+ 3,285 -0.590*** 1.638*** 1.876*** 0.715***
BB 4,425 -0.536*** 1.868*** 2.157*** 0.785***
BB- 5,269 -0.533*** 2.135*** 2.474*** 0.930***
B+ 4,250 -0.481*** 2.148*** 2.531*** 0.906***
B 1,984 -0.856*** 2.256*** 2.615*** 0.849***
B- 927 -0.848*** 2.430*** 2.859*** 0.737***
CCC+  ̶  D 329 -1.100*** 3.080*** 3.438*** 1.323***
Panel B: By credit rating class
All 53,866 -0.338*** 1.333*** 1.549*** 0.562***
AAA/AA 3,564 -0.066*** 0.383*** 0.441*** 0.146***
A 12,495 -0.112*** 0.703*** 0.816*** 0.274***
BBB 17,338 -0.263*** 1.148*** 1.338*** 0.515***
BB 12,979 -0.549*** 1.918*** 2.214*** 0.826***
B 7,161 -0.632*** 2.214*** 2.597*** 0.868***
CCC  ̶  D 329 -1.100*** 3.080*** 3.438*** 1.323***
Mean cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV ) (%)
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Table 10 – Cumulative abnormal trading volume around earnings releases for bad news 
This table shows the mean percentage cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) around earnings releases 
per rating category over the [-10,-2], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [+2,+10] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date) 
in the case of bad earnings news. CATV is as defined in section 4.2.1. while bad news and rating categories are 
defined in section 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based 
on (untabulated) two-tailed t-statistics. 
 
credit rating is lower and the relationship is strictly monotonic when considering the rating 
class categorization. For the [-1, +1] window, the mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes 
range from 0.334% (AA rating) to 3.080% (CCC+ - D rating). All abnormal reactions are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The three-day mean cumulative abnormal trading 
volume for the entire sample is 1.333%.  
Table 10 provides further evidence that the information content of earnings releases increases 
N (-10,-2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (+2,+10)
Panel A: By credit rating
All 28,124 -0.161*** 1.370*** 1.625*** 0.774***
AAA/AA+ 487 0.122 0.519*** 0.618*** 0.414***
AA 613 0.179*** 0.457*** 0.575*** 0.531***
AA- 720 0.253*** 0.578*** 0.718*** 0.505***
A+ 1,282 0.225*** 0.742*** 0.917*** 0.658***
A 2,359 0.236*** 0.846*** 1.053*** 0.631***
A- 2,039 0.110* 0.800*** 0.992*** 0.616***
BBB+ 2,355 0.221*** 1.099*** 1.344*** 0.923***
BBB 3,433 -0.087* 1.073*** 1.306*** 0.794***
BBB- 2,597 -0.261*** 1.487*** 1.776*** 0.866***
BB+ 1,639 -0.296*** 1.489*** 1.756*** 0.826***
BB 2,165 -0.183** 1.888*** 2.243*** 1.081***
BB- 2,878 -0.314*** 1.949*** 2.289*** 0.881***
B+ 2,714 -0.510*** 1.847*** 2.169*** 0.866***
B 1,591 -0.531*** 1.975*** 2.278*** 0.712***
B- 799 -1.427*** 1.781*** 1.922*** 0.215
CCC+  ̶  D 453 -0.756** 2.554*** 2.663*** 0.572
Panel B: By credit rating class
All 28,124 -0.161*** 1.370*** 1.625*** 0.774***
AAA/AA 1,820 0.193*** 0.521*** 0.643*** 0.489***
A 5,680 0.188*** 0.806*** 1.000*** 0.632***
BBB 8,385 -0.054 1.208*** 1.462*** 0.853***
BB 6,682 -0.267*** 1.817*** 2.143*** 0.932***
B 5,104 -0.660*** 1.877*** 2.165*** 0.716***
CCC  ̶  D 453 -0.756** 2.554*** 2.663*** 0.572
Mean cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV ) (%)
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Figure 3 – Information content of earnings releases per rating category 
These figures show the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and trading volumes (CATVs) 
around earnings announcements per rating category, in the case of good and bad earnings news, over the [-1,+1] 
time interval (t=0 signifies announcement date). CAR and CATV are as defined in section 4.2.1. while good and 
bad news as well as rating categories are defined in section 4.2.2. The figures are based on the results of Tables 
7, 8, 9 and 10.  
 
when a company has a lower credit rating. In the case of bad earnings news, trading volume 
reactions increase as the rating comes down. For the three-day window, the mean cumulative 
abnormal trading volumes range from 0.457% (AA rating) to 2.554% (CCC+ - D rating) 
while 1.370% is the figure for the entire sample when considering bad news.  
The previous results are summarized in Figure 3 which points out the increasing amount of 
information content of earnings releases as credit ratings become lower. In the case of good 
and bad news, both abnormal returns and trading volumes tend to have a more significant 
reaction when credit ratings are worse. All in all, these results are consistent with the first 
hypothesis of this thesis.  
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5.1.2. Role of ratings in the case of good and bad earnings news 
The second hypothesis states that better credit ratings decrease information asymmetry 
especially in the case of negative news. Thus lower ratings should have a stronger effect on 
the market reaction to earnings announcements when negative earnings surprises are reported. 
However, as shown in Figure 3, the univariate results do not provide support to this 
hypothesis. When looking at cumulative abnormal returns, the market reaction differences 
between higher and lower ratings appear similar for good and bad earnings news. 
Furthermore, when abnormal trading volumes are analyzed, it seems as if the market reactions 
are more pronounced for lower ratings in the case of good news. The inferences are also the 
same when market reactions for the [-2, +2] announcement window are considered. 
5.1.3. Influence of preceding rating changes 
Unreported tables12 exhibit results for different subsamples (no rating change, downgrade, 
upgrade) in order to analyze the impact that preceding rating changes might have on the 
information content of earnings releases. The main results are summarized in Figure 4 which 
shows the three-day mean cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes per rating class 
for the abovementioned subsamples. The focus is on the possible effect of preceding 
downgrades.  
The results offer mixed findings regarding the third hypothesis of this thesis which establishes 
that the market reaction to earnings announcements should be stronger when the 
announcements are preceded by credit rating downgrades. Panel A of Figure 4 does, for the 
most part, provide consistent results in the case of good earnings news. Excluding the highest 
rating class AAA/AA, all other rating classes are associated with more pronounced mean 
cumulative abnormal returns when earnings releases are preceded by rating downgrades. For 
example, within the BBB rating class, the three-day mean cumulative abnormal return is 
1.799% when there is a preceding downgrade while the reactions are 1.021% and 0.619% in 
the case of no rating change and preceding upgrades, respectively. On the other hand, Panel B 
suggests that, instead of downgrades, preceding upgrades tend to produce more negative 
returns for each rating class. A possible explanation for this is that the market is surprised by a 
negative earnings surprise from a company that has just been upgraded by a rating agency. 
This, in turn, means that the market also seems to value the signal provided by credit rating 
                                                          
12 All the unreported results of this study are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 4 – Preceding rating changes and the information content of earnings disclosures 
These figures present the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and trading volumes (CATVs) 
around earnings announcements per rating class, in the case of good and bad earnings news, over the [-1,+1] 
time interval (t=0 signifies announcement date) for the no rating change, downgrade and upgrade subsamples. 
CAR and CATV are as defined in section 4.2.1. while good and bad news as well as rating categories and 
preceding rating changes are defined in section 4.2.2. 
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upgrades. As far as abnormal trading volume reactions are concerned, there seem to be no 
clear patterns although rating classes AAA/AA, A, BBB and BB are associated with higher 
increases in trading volume when earnings releases are preceded by downgrades in the event 
of bad news. The mean abnormal reactions for observations preceded by rating downgrades in 
Figure 4 are all statistically significant except for the abnormal returns of the AAA/AA rating 
class (low amount of observations).   
5.1.4. Sample partition by information asymmetry 
The fourth research question of this study hypothesizes that credit ratings should have a more 
significant impact on the information content of earnings announcements when firms are 
characterized by more information asymmetry. Unreported tables present results for low and 
high information asymmetry subsamples in order to examine whether the impact of credit 
ratings on the information content of earnings releases differs between low and high 
information asymmetry firms. The main results are summarized in Figure 5 which shows the 
three-day market reactions per rating class for the abovementioned subsamples when the 
information asymmetry proxies used are stock volatility and asset tangibility. 
Overall, the univariate results provide a good degree of support to the fourth hypothesis. 
Panels A and B of Figure 5 demonstrate that mean cumulative abnormal returns increase 
(decrease) monotonically in the event of good (bad) news as ratings become lower among 
high information asymmetry firms while the influence of ratings is much less significant 
among firms characterized by low information asymmetry. For instance, when observations 
are partitioned based on stock volatility, abnormal returns are more pronounced for high 
information asymmetry firms when ratings are lower whereas the relationship appears to be 
nowhere near linear for low information asymmetry firms. When looking at trading volume 
reactions, although the differences between low and high information asymmetry firms are 
not as distinct, the fact remains that lower ratings are associated with stronger market 
reactions. Unreported results indicate that the evidence is more mixed when the market-to-
book ratio is used as the information asymmetry proxy.  
5.1.5. Subsamples for Regulation Fair Disclosure hypothesis 
Unreported univariate results address the fifth research question which investigates whether 
the impact of ratings on the informativeness of earnings disclosures has changed over time.  
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Figure 5 – The influence of credit ratings on the market reactions to earnings 
announcements for low and high information asymmetry firms 
These figures show the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and trading volumes (CATVs) 
around earnings announcements per rating class, in the case of good and bad earnings news, over the [-1,+1] 
time interval (t=0 signifies announcement date) for the low and high information asymmetry subsamples. The 
information asymmetry proxy is stock volatility on the left side and asset tangibility on the right side. CAR and 
CATV are as defined in section 4.2.1. while good and bad news as well as rating categories and information 
asymmetry subsamples are defined in section 4.2.2.  
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Figure 6 – Information content of earnings releases by rating for different time periods 
These figures provide the mean percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and trading volumes (CATVs) 
around earnings announcements per rating class, in the case of good and bad earnings news, over the [-1,+1] 
time interval (t=0 signifies announcement date) for different time periods. CAR and CATV are as defined in 
section 4.2.1. while good and bad news as well as rating categories and time periods are defined in section 4.2.2. 
 
Panel A: Mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) - Good news
Panel B: Mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) - Bad news
Panel C: Mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) - Good news
Panel D: Mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) - Bad news
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
AAA/AA A BBB BB B CCC  ̶  D
C
A
R
 (
-1
,+
1
) 
 (
%
)
Before November 2000 November 2000 ̶  August 2010 After August 2010
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
AAA/AA A BBB BB B CCC  ̶  D
C
A
R
 (
-1
,+
1
) 
 (
%
)
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
AAA/AA A BBB BB B CCC  ̶  D
C
A
T
V
 (
-1
,+
1
) 
 (
%
)
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
AAA/AA A BBB BB B CCC  ̶  D
C
A
T
V
 (
-1
,+
1
) 
 (
%
)
75 
 
 
More precisely, the focus is on the period when rating agencies had an exemption from 
Regulation Fair Disclosure. Figure 6 exhibits the main findings from the unreported results 
for three different time periods: before November 2000, November 2000 to August 2010 and 
September 2010 onwards. 
The conclusions from Figure 6 are consistent with the fifth hypothesis of this paper. 
Compared with the period before November 2000, mean cumulative abnormal returns are 
more pronounced when credit ratings deteriorate during the period when rating agencies had 
an exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure, that is, from November 2000 to August 2010. 
Furthermore, this phenomenon is also visible for mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes 
in the event of good earnings news. Overall, the evidence from the unreported results thus 
implies that better credit ratings seem to have improved their ability to decrease information 
asymmetry after Regulation Fair Disclosure was implemented. The findings are similar if 
information content is measured using five-day abnormal reactions. 
Another interesting finding is that credit ratings have continued to affect the information 
content of earnings announcements after August 2010 as the market reactions increase when 
credit ratings worsen. For example, in the case of bad news, mean cumulative abnormal 
trading volumes range from 0.647% of rating class AAA/AA to 4.139% of rating class     
CCC - D. These results are in line with the notion that, despite the removal of the exemption, 
rating agencies have retained their information advantage.   
5.2. Results of multivariate cross-sectional regressions 
5.2.1. Effect of rating levels on the information content of earnings announcements 
Regression analysis provides more colour on the impact that ratings might have as we can 
control for other variables (e.g., the amount of unexpected earnings) which are also expected 
to affect the information content of earnings releases. While the univariate analysis shows the 
correlation of credit ratings with the abnormal reactions to earnings announcements, the 
regression equations will help determine whether credit ratings summarize existing market 
information or if they convey additional valuable information to the market. 
Table 11 presents regression results regarding the first and second hypotheses of this thesis. 
Despite some differences with the univariate evidence, the regression results based on the 
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Table 11 – Regression analysis: The effect of rating levels on the information content of 
earnings announcements 
This table presents the regression results based on equations (9), (10) and (11). The dependent variables are the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and trading volume (CATV) around earnings announcements over the          
[-1,+1] and [-2,+2] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date). The independent variables are in the first 
column. The definitions for the variables can be found in Table 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed t-statistics. All t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
(Continued) 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV )
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Panel A: Linear rating specification
Constant 0.0280*** 6.23 0.0366*** 7.18 -0.0049 -1.45 -0.0027 -0.68
UE 2.9048*** 20.87 3.2573*** 20.53 0.6318*** 9.97 0.7767*** 9.63
BAD -0.0118* -1.91 -0.0218*** -3.11 -0.0086*** -3.04 -0.0119*** -3.31
UE * BAD -2.4197*** -16.26 -2.7720*** -16.06 -0.8216*** -11.46 -1.0295*** -11.42
RATING 0.0000 0.02 -0.0004** -1.98 0.0015*** 11.10 0.0017*** 10.68
RATING * BAD -0.0025*** -8.71 -0.0024*** -7.38 0.0001 0.42 0.0001 0.79
Control variables:
ANALYST# 0.0027*** 3.61 0.0037*** 4.39 0.0071*** 13.31 0.0077*** 12.41
SIZE -0.0024*** -5.93 -0.0034*** -7.22 -0.0011*** -3.75 -0.0016*** -4.70
TIMELINESS -0.0000 -1.16 -0.0000 -0.94 -0.0001*** -4.06 -0.0001*** -3.88
FOREDISP -1.1027*** -5.78 -1.1461*** -5.25 -0.3140*** -3.55 -0.3172*** -2.72
VOL -0.1134** -2.16 -0.1470** -2.48 0.2517*** 8.22 0.2069*** 5.52
LEV -0.0025 -1.00 -0.0013 -0.44 -0.0087*** -4.45 -0.0089*** -3.86
EARNVOL 0.0001 1.13 0.0001 1.04 0.0000 0.52 0.0000 0.24
PROFIT -0.0424** -2.28 -0.0490** -2.35 0.0694*** 4.91 0.0899*** 5.34
TAN -0.0058*** -2.98 -0.0053** -2.45 -0.0040*** -2.86 -0.0041** -2.53
MB -0.0000 -0.13 -0.0001 -0.54 0.0002*** 3.64 0.0003*** 4.10
ANALYST# * BAD -0.0036*** -2.87 -0.0045*** -3.11 0.0011* 1.77 0.0016** 2.08
SIZE * BAD 0.0006 0.86 0.0015* 1.96 0.0014*** 4.72 0.0019*** 4.89
TIMELINESS * BAD 0.0001 1.21 0.0001* 1.83 0.0000* 1.70 0.0001 1.56
FOREDISP * BAD 2.5146*** 9.48 2.7713*** 9.22 0.0689 0.64 0.0286 0.20
VOL * BAD -0.0551 -0.72 -0.0139 -0.16 -0.0362 -1.14 -0.0511 -1.24
LEV * BAD 0.0159*** 3.45 0.0135** 2.54 -0.0015 -0.71 -0.0027 -1.05
EARNVOL * BAD -0.0001 -0.52 -0.0001 -0.57 -0.0001* -1.65 -0.0001 -1.51
PROFIT * BAD -0.0420 -1.27 -0.0350 -0.94 -0.0322* -1.84 -0.0408* -1.81
TAN * BAD 0.0162*** 4.56 0.0161*** 4.05 -0.0038** -2.36 -0.0049** -2.33
MB * BAD 0.0001 0.39 0.0001 0.43 -0.0001 -1.24 -0.0002 -1.44
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2)
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR )
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Table 11 – Continued 
 
(Continued) 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV )
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Panel A: Linear rating specification
Observations 62,788 62,788 62,788 62,788
Number of firms 2,324 2,324 2,324 2,324
R
2 0.0871 0.0802 0.1754 0.1421
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel B: Rating dummy specification
Constant 0.0264*** 5.51 0.0329*** 6.07 0.0015 0.45 0.0047 1.18
UE 2.9331*** 21.11 3.2959*** 20.81 0.6309*** 10.04 0.7733*** 9.63
BAD -0.0211*** -3.10 -0.0301*** -3.83 -0.0137*** -4.70 -0.0184*** -4.95 
UE * BAD -2.4473*** -16.48 -2.8136*** -16.34 -0.8247*** -11.62 -1.0344*** -11.55 
AA -0.0008 -0.30 -0.0009 -0.31 0.0010 0.67 0.0013 0.74
AA- -0.0016 -0.67 -0.0020 -0.81 0.0022 1.37 0.0023 1.25
A+ -0.0006 -0.29 -0.0005 -0.22 0.0019 1.31 0.0022 1.30
A -0.0006 -0.25 -0.0010 -0.43 0.0034** 2.28 0.0037** 2.12
A- -0.0010 -0.45 -0.0023 -0.94 0.0037** 2.40 0.0038** 2.13
BBB+ -0.0000 -0.02 -0.0013 -0.54 0.0056*** 3.61 0.0063*** 3.48
BBB 0.0006 0.27 -0.0012 -0.46 0.0070*** 4.35 0.0077*** 4.12
BBB- -0.0006 -0.27 -0.0030 -1.14 0.0102*** 5.95 0.0114*** 5.72
BB+ 0.0011 0.42 -0.0005 -0.18 0.0116*** 5.97 0.0126*** 5.54
BB 0.0031 1.17 -0.0002 -0.05 0.0136*** 7.30 0.0150*** 6.97
BB- 0.0003 0.11 -0.0032 -1.04 0.0156*** 7.57 0.0176*** 7.31
B+ -0.0015 -0.51 -0.0046 -1.35 0.0167*** 7.60 0.0190*** 7.41
B -0.0044 -1.20 -0.0107** -2.56 0.0159*** 5.70 0.0182*** 5.49
B- -0.0044 -0.97 -0.0085* -1.68 0.0196*** 6.16 0.0230*** 6.12
CCC+  ̶  D -0.0177** -2.31 -0.0271*** -3.22 0.0276*** 5.40 0.0295*** 4.82
AA * BAD -0.0013 -0.27 -0.0038 -0.68 0.0032** 2.07 0.0040** 2.05
AA- * BAD 0.0016 0.37 -0.0012 -0.25 0.0032** 2.05 0.0040** 2.13
A+ * BAD -0.0038 -0.95 -0.0036 -0.77 0.0045*** 3.07 0.0056*** 3.10
A * BAD -0.0059 -1.53 -0.0067 -1.43 0.0048*** 3.30 0.0064*** 3.60
A- * BAD -0.0065* -1.72 -0.0057 -1.24 0.0047*** 3.26 0.0064*** 3.53
BBB+ * BAD -0.0075* -1.90 -0.0079 -1.64 0.0061*** 4.03 0.0076*** 4.06
BBB * BAD -0.0136*** -3.51 -0.0132*** -2.81 0.0044*** 2.98 0.0060*** 3.30
BBB- * BAD -0.0157*** -3.76 -0.0155*** -3.13 0.0053*** 3.09 0.0067*** 3.22
BB+ * BAD -0.0174*** -3.97 -0.0190*** -3.60 0.0040** 2.03 0.0060** 2.46
BB * BAD -0.0234*** -5.21 -0.0236*** -4.43 0.0062*** 3.29 0.0090*** 3.81
BB- * BAD -0.0261*** -5.59 -0.0246*** -4.49 0.0053*** 2.68 0.0077*** 3.12
B+ * BAD -0.0274*** -5.25 -0.0278*** -4.52 0.0053** 2.39 0.0074*** 2.68
B * BAD -0.0241*** -3.77 -0.0204*** -2.75 0.0056** 2.11 0.0078** 2.32
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR )
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2)
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Table 11 – Continued 
 
linear rating model in Panel A show that credit ratings have an impact on the information 
content of earnings announcements. The first column of results shows that, as far as three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are concerned, ratings have a significant effect only in the case 
of bad earnings news. As the coefficient for the rating variable is zero, the coefficient of         
Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV )
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Panel B: Rating dummy specification
B- * BAD -0.0312*** -4.12 -0.0303*** -3.40 -0.0043 -1.21 -0.0057 -1.30 
CCC+  ̶  D * BAD -0.0196* -1.81 -0.0185 -1.44 0.0002 0.04 0.0003 0.04
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,788 62,788 62,788 62,788
Number of firms 2,324 2,324 2,324 2,324
R
2 0.0879 0.0810 0.1779 0.1442
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel C: Rating class dummy specification
Constant 0.0239*** 5.71 0.0293*** 6.15 0.0059** 1.98 0.0096*** 2.75
UE 2.9289*** 21.06 3.2817*** 20.69 0.6338*** 10.00 0.7773*** 9.62
BAD -0.0229*** -3.89 -0.0336*** -4.99 -0.0112*** -4.29 -0.0152*** -4.51
UE * BAD -2.4500*** -16.47 -2.8069*** -16.25 -0.8220*** -11.52 -1.0314*** -11.47
A 0.0004 0.38 0.0002 0.13 0.0015** 1.99 0.0015* 1.69
BBB 0.0014 1.16 0.0001 0.10 0.0055*** 6.11 0.0061*** 5.70
BB 0.0032** 2.04 0.0011 0.63 0.0111*** 8.86 0.0123*** 8.33
B -0.0006 -0.27 -0.0036 -1.47 0.0134*** 7.98 0.0154*** 7.74
CCC  ̶  D -0.0149** -2.05 -0.0228*** -2.84 0.0236*** 4.90 0.0249*** 4.28
A * BAD -0.0055*** -2.66 -0.0036 -1.49 0.0023*** 2.92 0.0032*** 3.10
BBB * BAD -0.0121*** -5.40 -0.0101*** -3.93 0.0028*** 3.16 0.0037*** 3.26
BB * BAD -0.0219*** -8.01 -0.0201*** -6.45 0.0032** 2.57 0.0050*** 3.20
B * BAD -0.0252*** -6.55 -0.0229*** -5.20 0.0021 1.22 0.0032 1.48
CCC  ̶  D * BAD -0.0174* -1.70 -0.0154 -1.28 -0.0009 -0.17 -0.0010 -0.15
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,788 62,788 62,788 62,788
Number of firms 2,324 2,324 2,324 2,324
R
2 0.0871 0.0804 0.1750 0.1417
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR )
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2)
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-0.0025 for the interaction between ratings and bad news, which is significant at the 1% level, 
implies that a one notch decrease in a company’s credit rating is associated with a 0.25% 
more negative stock market reaction to earnings releases in the event of bad earnings news. 
However, contrary to my hypothesis, the findings for the [-2, +2] announcement window 
suggest that abnormal returns are lower for worse credit ratings also in the event of good news 
(coefficient = -0.0004) although the effect is very small in magnitude. When information 
content is measured through abnormal trading volume reactions, the coefficients for the rating 
variable are 0.0015 and 0.0017 for the three- and five-day windows, respectively, with both 
being significant at the 1% level. The impact of ratings is the same for good and bad news as 
the coefficients for the interaction between rating and bad news are not significant. Therefore, 
a one notch lower credit rating results in 0.15%/0.17% more of the outstanding shares being 
traded in the market around an earnings announcement. This further supports the notion that 
lower ratings increase the information content of earnings releases as there is more 
information asymmetry surrounding these firms.  
The alternative rating specifications of the regression model yield similar results. Figure 7 
provides a summary of the findings of Panel B and Panel C in Table 11. Panel A of Figure 7 
demonstrates that, in the case of bad earnings news, the regression coefficient of credit ratings 
tends to decrease as ratings become lower. In the rating class dummy specification model, the 
impact of ratings is strictly monotonic. For example, a one notch lower rating class results in 
an approximately 0.65% more negative cumulative abnormal return on average. However, no 
clear relationship exists in the case of good news. When measuring information content 
through abnormal trading volume reactions, the coefficients exhibit an increase in trading 
volume as ratings deteriorate; the relationship is strictly monotonic when rating classes are the 
independent variables. For the rating dummy specification, the coefficients range from 0.001 
(0.004) for rating AA to 0.028 (0.028) for rating CCC+ - D in the case of good (bad) news. 
Coefficients based on models where the dependent variable (CAR/CATV) is measured over 
the five-day announcement window offer qualitatively equivalent findings.  
The regression results in Table 11 are in line with the first hypothesis of this study. Apart 
from abnormal returns in the case of good earnings news, lower credit ratings are associated 
with more pronounced market reactions meaning that the information content of earnings 
releases is higher for lower rated companies. Since the abnormal trading volumes increase as 
ratings become lower in the case of good news as well, I also conclude that the information  
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Figure 7 – Regression coefficients: The effect of rating levels on the information content 
of earnings announcements 
These figures present the regression coefficients related to rating variables from the rating dummy and rating 
class dummy models of Table 11 where the dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal return and trading 
volume over the [-1,+1] time interval. The coefficient for good news equals the stand-alone coefficient of each 
rating variable. The coefficient for bad news equals the sum of the stand-alone coefficient of each rating variable 
and the interaction of the same rating variable with the bad news dummy. The reference categories are rating 
categories AAA/AA+ (rating dummy specification) and AAA/AA (rating class dummy specification). 
 
content of earnings announcements increases with lower ratings when there is positive 
earnings surprise. As explained in section 3.1., this scenario, where lower rated companies’ 
stock prices are not affected whereas trading volumes are, indicates that the earnings report is 
informative to individual investors although the overall market ultimately sees no financial 
value in the announcement. All in all, higher credit ratings appear to reduce to the information 
asymmetry surrounding firms and thus better rated firms’ earnings disclosures have less 
informational value in the stock market.  
 
Rating dummy specification Rating class dummy specification
Panel A - Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) (-1,+1)
Panel B - Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV) (-1,+1)
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5.2.2. Role of ratings depending on the sign of unexpected earnings 
The regression results provide new insights regarding the second hypothesis of this paper. 
They are consistent with the notion that lower ratings result in stronger market reactions to 
earnings announcements in the event of negative earnings surprises. As mentioned earlier, 
Panel A of Table 11 shows that ratings have a significant impact on the stock price reactions 
of earnings disclosures only in the case of bad earnings news. In addition, the two other rating 
specifications of the regression model yield the same results. Panel A of Figure 7 
demonstrates how cumulative abnormal returns decrease as credit ratings deteriorate when 
there is a negative earnings surprise while ratings do not consistently affect the 
informativeness of earnings releases when good news are reported. With regard to trading 
volume reactions, the regression results for all model specifications arrive at the same 
conclusion: lower ratings increase the cumulative abnormal trading volumes as hypothesized 
but the effect is the same for positive and negative news.  
Overall, this evidence supports the notion that lower rated firms’ earnings announcements 
have more informational value in the case of negative earnings news compared to positive 
news. While the information content of earnings disclosures increases with lower credit 
ratings for both good and bad news based on trading volume reactions, the stock price effects 
are more pronounced for lower ratings only when negative earnings surprises are announced. 
Thus it appears that, due to the long-term uncertainty associated with poorly rated firms, 
investors see good earnings news from them as less informative.  
5.2.3. Credit rating changes before earnings announcements  
Table 12 exhibits the regression analysis for the linear rating model of hypothesis 3 in order to 
analyze the influence of preceding rating changes on the informational value of earnings 
releases. Like the univariate evidence earlier, the regression results provide mixed findings 
regarding the role of preceding downgrades. When abnormal return reactions are used to 
represent information content, the only significant coefficient related to preceding rating 
changes belongs to the downgrade variable (coefficient of 0.0044; significant at the 10% 
level). The interpretation is that a preceding downgrade increases cumulative abnormal 
returns by 0.44% in the case of both positive and negative earnings shocks. Therefore, the 
hypothesized effect exists for positive news only as I expected preceding downgrades to be  
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Table 12 – Regression analysis: The role of credit rating changes before earnings 
announcements 
This table reports the regression results based on equation (12) (linear rating model). The dependent variables are 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and trading volume (CATV) around earnings announcements over the    
[-1,+1] and [-2,+2] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date). The independent variables are in the first 
column. The definitions for the variables can be found in Table 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed t-statistics. All t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
associated with more information content, and thus more extreme share price declines, in the 
case of bad news. However, the regression result could mean that investors lower their 
expectations after downgrades which would result in negative earnings surprises having less 
information content. This, in turn, would be consistent with the idea that credit rating 
downgrades are valuable information to stock market investors. 
The evidence from abnormal trading volume reactions shows that, instead of downgrades, 
preceding upgrades appear to increase the informational value of earnings announcements. 
The coefficients for the upgrade variable are 0.0016 and 0.0023 for the three- and five-day 
windows, respectively, with both being significant at the 5% level. Therefore, a preceding 
upgrade results in 0.16%/0.23% more of the outstanding shares being traded in the market 
around an earnings release. It is possible that, during an earnings announcement period, the 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV )
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Constant 0.0283*** 6.31 0.0371*** 7.29 -0.0048 -1.40 -0.0025 -0.64
UE 2.9021*** 20.78 3.2530*** 20.45 0.6347*** 10.00 0.7798*** 9.65
BAD -0.0119* -1.93 -0.0220*** -3.15 -0.0085*** -3.02 -0.0117*** -3.26
UE * BAD -2.4091*** -16.12 -2.7581*** -15.92 -0.8204*** -11.43 -1.0262*** -11.37
RATING -0.0000 -0.04 -0.0004** -2.01 0.0015*** 11.12 0.0017*** 10.68
RATING * BAD -0.0026*** -8.69 -0.0024*** -7.42 0.0000 0.35 0.0001 0.70
DOWNGRADE 0.0030 1.31 0.0044* 1.66 0.0006 0.67 0.0016 1.24
UPGRADE -0.0000 -0.01 -0.0030 -1.52 0.0016** 2.17 0.0023** 2.34
DOWNGRADE * BAD -0.0006 -0.16 0.0003 0.07 0.0007 0.45 0.0014 0.66
UPGRADE * BAD -0.0026 -0.69 -0.0005 -0.13 0.0014 0.82 0.0015 0.67
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,495 62,495 62,495 62,495
Number of firms 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313
R
2 0.0875 0.0808 0.1759 0.1426
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR )
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-1,+1) (-2,+2)
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market shows more interest towards the stock of a company that has been recently upgraded 
by a rating agency. Although the findings regarding preceding rating changes are not all as 
expected, the evidence does indicate that preceding rating changes, be it downgrades or 
upgrades, appear to impact the informational properties of earnings releases.  
Unreported results show that the findings are similar for the rating dummy and rating class 
dummy specifications of the regression model. In addition, in these models, when looking at 
the cumulative abnormal returns over the [-2, +2] window, the upgrade variable has a 
negative coefficient (-0.0034/-0.0033) which is significant at the 10% level. This indicates 
that preceding upgrades decrease (increase) the information content of earnings releases in the 
case of good (bad) news. Apparently investors trust the signal provided by upgrades since 
subsequent positive earnings news have less informational value while negative shocks 
convey considerable new information to the market.  
The results in Table 12 also show that the inferences regarding the impact of credit ratings on 
the information content of earnings announcements stay the same (as described in sections 
5.2.1. and 5.2.2.) even when the additional variables for preceding downgrades and upgrades 
are included in the model.  
5.2.4. Results for high and low information asymmetry firms 
The regression results for the fourth hypothesis, based on the linear rating specification, are 
shown in Table 13. In order to examine whether the effect of credit ratings on the information 
content of earnings releases is stronger for firms characterized by more information 
asymmetry, the attention is on how the regression coefficients related to ratings differ for high 
information asymmetry firms; this is achieved in the models by including interactions with 
information asymmetry dummy variables. In line with the univariate evidence, the regression 
results based on the linear rating model provide support to the fourth hypothesis.  
When stock volatility is used to determine the amount of information asymmetry surrounding 
firms Table 13 shows that the effect of ratings on the informativeness of earnings releases 
tends to increase. In the first column, the significant coefficient of -0.0005 for the interaction 
between ratings and the information asymmetry dummy means that a one notch lower rating 
has a more negative effect on abnormal returns for high information asymmetry firms. In 
other words (since the same coefficient for bad news is not significant), when firms report  
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Table 13 – Regression analysis: Results for high and low information asymmetry firms 
This table provides the regression results based on equation (13) (linear rating model). The dependent variables 
are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and trading volume (CATV) around earnings announcements over the    
[-1,+1] time interval (t=0 signifies announcement date). The independent variables are in the first column. The 
definitions for the variables can be found in Table 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on (untabulated) 
two-tailed t-statistics. All t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
negative earnings surprises the impact of ratings is more significant for high information 
asymmetry firms. When examining abnormal volume reactions the significant positive 
CAR CATV CAR CATV CAR CATV
Constant 0.0272*** -0.0020 0.0274*** -0.0041 0.0289*** 0.0024
UE 2.9173*** 0.6304*** 2.9072*** 0.6368*** 2.8999*** 0.6715***
BAD -0.0150** -0.0102*** -0.0119* -0.0108*** -0.0099 -0.0091***
UE * BAD -2.4231*** -0.8252*** -2.4160*** -0.8226*** -2.4098*** -0.8640***
RATING 0.0001 0.0013*** -0.0002 0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0008***
RATING * BAD -0.0022*** 0.0002* -0.0022*** 0.0002 -0.0027*** 0.0001
DOWNGRADE 0.0031 0.0008 0.0030 0.0006 0.0030 0.0008
UPGRADE -0.0001 0.0016** 0.0000 0.0017** -0.0000 0.0014*
DOWNGRADE * BAD -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0008
UPGRADE * BAD -0.0025 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0014 -0.0026 0.0016
IA_VOL 0.0086*** -0.0000
IA_VOL * BAD -0.0011 0.0056***
RATING * IA_VOL -0.0005** 0.0004***
RATING * IA_VOL * BAD -0.0005 -0.0005**
IA_TAN -0.0010 -0.0025*
IA_TAN * BAD 0.0054 0.0048***
RATING * IA_TAN 0.0003 0.0003*
RATING * IA_TAN * BAD -0.0008*** -0.0003*
IA_MB -0.0016 -0.0084***
IA_MB * BAD -0.0023 -0.0016
RATING * IA_MB 0.0001 0.0011***
RATING * IA_MB * BAD 0.0004 0.0001
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,495 62,495 62,495 62,495 62,495 62,495
Number of firms 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313
R
2 0.0881 0.1784 0.0876 0.1761 0.0876 0.1800
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Information asymmetry 
variable: VOL
Information asymmetry 
variable: TAN
Information asymmetry 
variable: MB
(-1,+1)(-1,+1)(-1,+1)
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regression coefficient of 0.0004 for the same interaction term implies that ratings have a 
greater impact on trading volumes for high information asymmetry firms; however, this is 
only true in the event of good earnings news as the bad news interaction term cancels the 
effect of the first interaction term. 
The findings are similar when asset tangibility and market-to-book ratio are assumed as 
proxies for information asymmetry. With the former as the proxy, the results in Table 13 
show that, when earnings announcements convey bad news, the ratings have a more 
pronounced effect on abnormal returns when firms are characterized by more information 
asymmetry. Furthermore, the conclusion is the same for cumulative abnormal trading 
volumes in the event of a positive earnings surprise. When market-to-book ratios are used to 
determine the level of information asymmetry surrounding companies, only the impacts on 
abnormal trading volume reactions provide meaningful results. The coefficient of 0.0011 
(significant at the 1% level) implies that a one notch lower rating has a 0.11% greater effect 
on the information content of earnings announcements when firms are characterized by a 
higher amount of information asymmetry.  
Unreported tables also provide the regression coefficients for the rating dummy and rating 
class dummy specifications of the regression model presented in Table 13. The main findings 
are shown in Figure 8 which exhibits the coefficients related to rating variables based on the 
rating class dummy model. These results also indicate that, in general, the impact of credit 
ratings on the market reactions to earnings releases appears to stronger when firms are 
characterized by more information asymmetry. Panel B of Figure 8 provides evidence that, 
when reported earnings are below expectations, the influence of lower ratings on negative 
abnormal returns is more pronounced for high information asymmetry firms. In addition, as 
demonstrated by Panels C and D, the phenomenon that trading volume reactions increase 
strictly monotonically as ratings become lower is more consistent among high information 
asymmetry firms. All in all, the results presented in this section are in line with the notion that 
better credit ratings decrease information asymmetry in financial markets especially when 
firms are otherwise associated with more information asymmetry problems.   
The results in Table 13 (i.e., regression coefficients for the rating variables without the 
interactions with information asymmetry dummies) also show that the hypothesized 
relationship between ratings and the information content of earnings releases holds true for 
low information asymmetry firms as well.  The rating variable coefficients for firms  
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Figure 8 – Regression coefficients: High and low information asymmetry firms 
These figures present the regression coefficients related to rating variables based on the rating class dummy 
specification of Equation (13) when the information asymmetry proxy used in the model is either stock volatility 
or asset tangibility. In the case of good earnings news, the coefficient for low information asymmetry firms 
equals the stand-alone coefficient of each rating variable while the coefficient for high information asymmetry 
firms equals the sum of the stand-alone coefficient of each rating variable and the interaction of the same rating 
variable with the information asymmetry dummy. In the case of bad earnings news, the coefficient for low 
information asymmetry firms is the sum of the stand-alone coefficient of each rating variable and the interaction 
of the same rating variable with the bad news dummy while the coefficient for high information asymmetry 
firms is the sum of the stand-alone coefficient of each rating variable, its interaction with the bad news dummy, 
its interaction with the information asymmetry dummy and its three-way interaction with both the bad news 
dummy and the information asymmetry dummy. The reference category is rating category AAA/AA. 
 
Information asymmetry variable: Stock volatility Information asymmetry variable: Asset tangibility
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) (-1,+1) as dependent variable - Good news
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) (-1,+1) as dependent variable - Bad news
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV) (-1,+1) as dependent variable - Good news
Panel D: Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV) (-1,+1) as dependent variable - Bad news
Low information asymmetry firms High information asymmetry firms
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characterized by a lower amount of information asymmetry are similar to the ones presented 
in Table 11. Therefore, even though I find the impact of ratings to be more significant for 
high information asymmetry firms, credit ratings also have a significant effect on the 
informativeness of earnings announcements when only low information asymmetry firms are 
considered. 
5.2.5. Impact of rating agencies’ exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure 
The fifth and final research question of this paper examines how the effect of ratings on the 
information content of earnings releases has changed over time. The regression results (linear 
rating specification) are presented in Table 14. The findings based on the regression 
coefficients support the hypothesis that credit ratings had a larger impact on the informational 
value of earnings announcements during the period when rating agencies had an exemption 
from Regulation Fair Disclosure. Moreover, the results also imply that the informational 
advantage of rating agencies has continued, if not increased, after the exemption was 
removed. Unreported results also show that the findings are qualitatively similar when the 
regression analysis is done using the rating dummy and rating class dummy specifications.  
When looking at the results in Table 14, we see that the impact of ratings on the 
informativeness of earnings releases increases in the period between November 2000 and 
August 2010 (exemption from Reg FD) compared with the period before that. When 
cumulative abnormal return is the dependent variable, the coefficients for the interaction of 
the rating variable with the Reg FD and bad earnings news dummy are -0.0010 and -0.0009 
for the [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] announcement windows, respectively. These coefficients, both 
significant at the 5% level, imply that credit ratings had a stronger effect, in the case of bad 
news, during the period when rating agencies had an exemption from Reg FD. Numerically, a 
one notch worse rating has an approximately -0.1% more negative impact on earnings 
announcement returns in the event of bad news during this time period. Contrary to the 
hypothesis of this study, abnormal returns once again do not increase as ratings deteriorate 
when there is a positive earnings surprise; the coefficient for the stand-alone rating variable is 
negative and the interaction with the Reg FD dummy is not significant. However, when 
cumulative abnormal trading volumes are analyzed, the positive significant coefficients for 
the interaction (0.0009/0.0011) indicate that the impact of ratings on the information content 
of earnings disclosures is stronger for good news as well in the period from November 2000 
to August 2010 compared with the time period prior to that.   
88 
 
 
Table 14 – Regression analysis: The impact of rating agencies’ exemption from 
Regulation Fair Disclosure 
This table shows the regression results based on equation (14) (linear rating model). The dependent variables are 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and trading volume (CATV) around earnings announcements over the    
[-1,+1] and [-2,+2] time intervals (t=0 signifies announcement date). The independent variables are in the first 
column. The definitions for the variables can be found in Table 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed t-statistics. All t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
The regression coefficients in Table 14 also offer interesting evidence that the effect of ratings 
has increased even after the Regulation Fair Disclosure exemption was removed from credit 
rating agencies. Regardless of the dependent variable, all relevant rating variable interactions 
are more significant in magnitude for the time period after August 2010. For instance, the 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATV )
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Constant 0.0420*** 10.34 0.0509*** 10.88 -0.0164*** -5.73 -0.0163*** -4.82
UE 2.8349*** 20.51 3.1771*** 20.12 0.6905*** 10.83 0.8429*** 10.38
BAD -0.0508*** -7.52 -0.0634*** -8.09 -0.0038 -1.22 -0.0055 -1.39
UE * BAD -2.3498*** -15.88 -2.6880*** -15.62 -0.8951*** -12.36 -1.1143*** -12.20
RATING -0.0005** -2.41 -0.0008*** -3.20 0.0013*** 8.96 0.0015*** 8.87
RATING * BAD -0.0000 -0.11 0.0001 0.32 0.0001 0.70 0.0002 0.80
DOWNGRADE 0.0035 1.53 0.0049* 1.85 0.0008 0.83 0.0018 1.43
UPGRADE -0.0002 -0.09 -0.0031 -1.61 0.0021*** 2.77 0.0029*** 2.85
DOWNGRADE * BAD -0.0011 -0.29 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0004 0.28 0.0010 0.45
UPGRADE * BAD -0.0028 -0.75 -0.0008 -0.19 0.0008 0.48 0.0008 0.34
IA_VOL 0.0080*** 3.89 0.0094*** 4.10 -0.0027** -2.44 -0.0023* -1.74
IA_VOL * BAD 0.0001 0.03 -0.0014 -0.32 0.0062*** 3.44 0.0079*** 3.50
RATING * IA_VOL -0.0005** -2.25 -0.0006** -2.49 0.0005*** 4.46 0.0006*** 3.83
RATING * IA_VOL * BAD -0.0006* -1.73 -0.0006 -1.28 -0.0005*** -2.85 -0.0007*** -2.92
FD 0.0020 1.02 0.0032 1.46 -0.0008 -0.67 -0.0007 -0.50
FD * BAD -0.0083** -2.21 -0.0107** -2.51 0.0086*** 4.85 0.0110*** 4.92
RATING * FD 0.0002 0.78 0.0001 0.24 0.0009*** 6.51 0.0011*** 6.46
RATING * FD * BAD -0.0010** -2.43 -0.0009** -1.97 -0.0006*** -2.99 -0.0007*** -2.80
POSTFD -0.0088*** -3.50 -0.0083*** -2.94 -0.0055*** -3.22 -0.0078*** -3.82
POSTFD * BAD 0.0033 0.68 0.0052 0.95 0.0004 0.18 -0.0007 -0.22
RATING * POSTFD 0.0010*** 3.65 0.0009*** 2.90 0.0011*** 6.00 0.0013*** 5.79
RATING * POSTFD * BAD -0.0023*** -4.40 -0.0024*** -4.21 0.0004 1.53 0.0006* 1.84
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No No
Observations 62,495 62,495 62,495 62,495
Number of firms 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313
R
2 0.0897 0.0825 0.1630 0.1281
F-stat. p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(-2,+2)(-1,+1)(-2,+2)(-1,+1)
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR )
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hypothesized role of credit ratings exists also in the case of good news for abnormal stock 
returns; the sum of the coefficients for the stand-alone rating variable (-0.0005/-0.0008) and 
interaction with post-FD dummy (0.0010/0.0009) is positive implying that lower ratings 
increase cumulative abnormal returns when there is a positive earnings surprise. In addition, 
the three-way interaction between the rating variable, post-FD dummy and bad news dummy 
is more negative and thus the impact of ratings on abnormal returns in the case of bad 
earnings news is also more pronounced in the period after August 2010 compared with earlier 
periods. When examining trading volume reactions, the regression coefficients for the 
interactions are slightly larger as well compared with the corresponding coefficients for the 
Reg FD period. All in all, these findings indicate that the impact of credit ratings on the 
information content of earnings announcements seems to have increased over time.  
The findings related to the previous research questions are also confirmed in Table 14 as its 
regression model incorporates all the variables relevant to the hypotheses of this study. The 
values of the regression coefficients for these variables are similar in magnitude compared to 
the previous models.   
5.2.6. Robustness of regression analyses 
Several robustness checks were conducted to increase the reliability of the results. In order to 
control for potential concerns related to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the 
regression analyses, all t-statistics are based on robust Huber-White standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. In addition, other explanatory variables were tested but they did not improve 
the fit of the models. These variables included interest coverage, operating cash flow 
volatility, research & development intensity as well as dummies for a fourth quarter earnings 
announcement and recession year. The results of the regressions remained the same when 
their robustness with regard to the earnings variables was examined. For example, removing 
the most extreme earnings surprises (top and bottom 10%) had no impact on the results. 
Another robustness check which had no effect on results was to use the absolute value of the 
mean consensus analyst estimate instead of the stock price as the denominator in the 
unexpected earnings variable. Finally, the findings were identical when dummies for earnings 
surprise deciles were chosen to represent earnings variables in the regression analyses.   
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6. Conclusions 
In this thesis, I examine how the credit rating of a company affects the information content, 
i.e., the stock price and/or trading volume reaction, of its earnings announcements in stock 
markets. I also study how this impact differs between positive and negative earnings news as 
well as analyzing the effects of preceding rating changes. Finally, the empirical analysis 
examines how the relationship between ratings and informativeness of earnings 
announcements is affected by the level of information asymmetry surrounding firms and 
disclosure regulation changes. The main underlying notion behind the hypotheses of this 
study is that better credit ratings decrease the information asymmetry and uncertainty 
surrounding a firm and thus the earnings announcements of lower rated firms should possess 
more information content as there is less visibility regarding the future financial performance 
of these riskier firms.  
Although many papers look into the different drivers of earnings releases’ information 
content, according to my knowledge, this is the first study to provide a comprehensive view 
on the impact that credit ratings have in this context. As there is still some uncertainty 
regarding the benefits of credit ratings in stock markets, the findings of this study should 
provide more colour on the informational role of ratings in equity markets. Furthermore, the 
results should be of interest to equity investors as well as managers of public corporations 
who aim to improve their understanding of the reactions to earnings news. The topic of this 
thesis is also timely given the recent criticism of rating agencies due to concerns related to 
conflicts of interest.  
The empirical analysis of this study is based on 81,990 earnings announcements made in the 
US stock market by S&P rated firms in the period from February 1986 to December 2013. 
The methodology of this paper consists of traditional event study methods employing both 
univariate analysis and multivariate regressions where the information content of earnings 
releases is measured over the [-1, +1] and [-2, +2] announcement windows.  
Consistent with the first hypothesis of this study, my results show that lower credit ratings 
increase the information content of earnings announcements. The univariate evidence 
demonstrates that the stock price and trading volume reactions around earnings disclosures 
are more pronounced for firms with lower ratings. When firms report good earnings news, 
mean cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes around the earnings announcement 
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increase as ratings become lower. In the case of bad news, lower ratings are associated with 
more negative abnormal returns and higher trading volumes. These univariate results are in 
line with the previous findings by Greatrex (2009). The regression results of my thesis 
provide further evidence that credit ratings are a significant driver of earnings releases’ 
information content as market reactions tend to be larger for lower rated companies. In the 
event of a negative earnings surprise, a one notch decrease in a company’s credit rating is 
associated with a 0.25% more negative stock price reaction to earnings announcements. The 
implication is that if a firm’s reported earnings are below expectations, with a market cap of 
$2B (approximate median of my sample), a one notch lower rating would result in the firm’s 
shareholders experiencing additional total losses of $5M, all else being equal. In addition, the 
regression coefficients indicate that, for both good and bad earnings news, a one notch lower 
credit rating results in 0.15%/0.17% more of the outstanding shares being traded in the market 
around an earnings announcement. Overall, my findings do not support the results of Leventis 
et al. (2014) who argue that higher ratings increase the informativeness of earnings 
announcements. As mentioned earlier in this paper, their study lacks robust methodology and 
thus I have confidence that my results provide a better picture regarding the impact of ratings 
on the information content of earnings releases.  
While all the results demonstrate that market reactions around earnings announcements 
increase for lower rated companies in the event of bad news, the regression analysis does not 
provide consistent results indicating that abnormal returns are higher for companies with 
worse ratings when positive earnings news are announced. This implies that the impact of 
ratings on the information content of earnings announcements is not as strong in the case of 
positive earnings shock. Nevertheless, since the regression analysis shows that trading 
volumes increase for lower ratings in the event of good news, I conclude that earnings 
announcements of lower rated companies provide more information also when good news are 
reported. However, based on the inconclusive results related to the stock price reactions this 
additional information content is not always enough to generate a similar increase in the value 
of these lower rated firms. Thus, in the case of positive earnings news, there appears to be 
some truth to the idea that, as argued by Leventis et al. (2014), the stock market seems to find 
information provided by lower rated entities less credible. Overall, the evidence supports the 
second hypothesis of this paper as credit ratings seem to have a more significant impact on the 
information content of earnings releases when the reported earnings are below expectations. 
As mentioned before, lower rated firms experience larger stock price declines after an 
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earnings disappointment implying that the positive signal provided by a better rating results in 
a below-expectations earnings announcement having less significance for higher rated firms.  
Additional univariate and multivariate analyses identify the specific circumstances in which 
the impact of credit ratings on the information content of earnings announcements is more 
pronounced. Firstly, the effect of credit ratings is more significant when firms are 
characterized by more information asymmetry problems. Lower ratings are associated with 
even stronger market reactions when focusing on high information asymmetry firms. 
Secondly, the impact of credit ratings on the informational value of earnings announcements 
increased when rating agencies were given an exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
Moreover, cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes around earnings releases have 
continued to be even more pronounced for lower ratings over time despite the removal of the 
exemption in September 2010. These findings regarding high information asymmetry firms 
and disclosure regulation changes are both in line with my hypotheses and provide further 
evidence that better credit ratings decrease information asymmetry in financial markets. 
I also find that preceding rating changes play a role in the informativeness of earnings 
releases although the results are not entirely as hypothesized or as statistically significant. 
Even though I hypothesize that only preceding downgrades impact the informational value of 
earnings disclosures, the findings indicate that upgrades affect the informational properties of 
earnings releases as well. The regression results reveal that a preceding downgrade (upgrade) 
increases (decreases) cumulative abnormal returns by 0.44% (0.34%) in the case of both 
positive and negative earnings shocks. Thus preceding rating changes appear to magnify 
information content only when the nature of the earnings surprise does not reflect the signal 
provided by the rating change. In other words, if earnings announcements convey good news 
following a rating downgrade, announcement returns increase. Likewise, in the case of bad 
news, abnormal returns are more negative if earnings releases are preceded by an upgrade. In 
addition, it seems that the stock market shows more interest towards the stock of a company 
that has been recently upgraded by a rating agency since preceding upgrades increase the 
trading volume reaction to earnings announcements.  
To summarize, the main finding of this thesis is that the information content of a firm’s 
earnings announcement increases when the firm’s credit rating is lower. This is consistent 
with the idea that higher credit ratings reduce the information asymmetry and uncertainty 
surrounding a firm. Earnings releases by lower rated firms provide more information 
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regarding a firm’s financial prospects as they lack the positive signal of a better rating. While 
the literature review of this paper presents findings from financial markets which indicate that 
better credit ratings reduce information asymmetry, this study is the first to properly show that 
the same phenomenon exists in the context of earnings announcements in stock markets as 
well. The results of this study should provide useful information to stock market investors and 
managers of public companies. Based on my results, holding all other things constant, 
investors can expect lower rated firms to have larger market reactions to earnings 
announcements. The impact of credit ratings is especially significant in the case of negative 
earnings surprises as stocks of lower rated firms tend to experience considerably greater 
market value losses. For managers, the main takeaway is that the stock market finds earnings 
announcements of lower rated firms more relevant and thus the earnings reports of riskier 
firms are more important. Furthermore, as lower rated firms are surrounded by greater 
information asymmetry due to lacking the certification effect of higher ratings, the earnings 
releases of firms with lower credit ratings tend to generate a less favourable stock market 
reaction. All else being equal, positive earnings news have a hard time increasing the value of 
lower rated firms while negative earnings surprises for these firms result in greater stock price 
declines.    
This thesis also prompts suggestions for further research. As my study finds a meaningful 
relationship between credit ratings and earnings announcements, it would be interesting to 
know more about the impact of ratings on the information content of other types of 
announcements in stock markets. Examples of announcements which could be influenced by 
a firm’s rating include news regarding mergers, dividends, restructurings and financing 
decisions as these usually generate stock market reactions and are associated with 
informational problems. My study could also be extended by examining whether there is a 
difference between the effects of different rating agencies’ credit ratings. While my paper’s 
results are based on S&P’s ratings, future studies could also consider ratings issued by 
Moody’s and Fitch. Finally, since my findings are based on US stock market data, future 
research could test if my results apply to stock markets of other countries as well. It might be 
the case that the importance of rating agencies and the informational role of ratings around 
earnings announcements might be even more significant in countries where equity markets 
are less transparent. 
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